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LEGAL PROVISIONS PURSUANT TO RUCA 24(a) '6X *-
URCP i pertinent part: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissable in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith ... Emphasis Added. 
URE : 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or 
explaining the event or condition made while the declarant 
was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter. Emphasis Added. 
URCP 11 states in pertinent part: 
...The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by 
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well founded in fact 
and warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation ... If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose on the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. Emphasis Added. 
Legend Yes(X) No(Oj 
&•/*£?* , -^;tM«NMJ MQNEYiSALES AGREEMENT: 
'~* EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: 
February 19, 1991 
i;*i*:»,:. f'Z* £?•' 
The undersigned Buyer 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount of 
in the form nf a c a s h i e r s C h e c k 
David J Stephan 1^ HbxirUd_ 
One Hundred «nc 
_ hereby deposits with Brokerage 
. Dollars ($ JL 00 ,00 _ j , 
in tne form oi n V ^ I I M W I J—»>» .^ - • • - . 
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable t>tate Law 
South Affl Property Mgint, 
Brokerage 
£ 0 1 - 2 0 » - 9 8 4 0'- Received by. 
Phone Number -
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1.' PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of theproperty situated at l ^ , . / ^ . ™ 
y n n l l r r f t ^ t . County of. ; Utah, 
^ V 
subject to any restrictive, covenants, zoning r e g u l a r utility ot <nher easements or rights of way. government fcatents^or
 state deeds of record approvedI by^Buyerin 
aco^ance 1 Section G: Said.property is y ^ y - J ^ C 5 B a r b ^ Y E T e r s a V ( *as sellers, and is ^ J " ^ ; ! ^ 
fl«. ^ ^ m f i a < ; l a h ( l v e _ 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacamt Lot _ _. _ ^ . 
B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Commarcial K] Residential "iDCondo • Other _ . ^ 
(a) included Items. Unless excluded below, » * sale shall /nc/ude all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A ,f presently a t t a c h e d ' ^ property. 
The following personal property shall also be riduded in tltk *ale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to t i t le :KetT lgeraTOT 
I Vacant Acreage . Q Other. 
(b) Excluded Items. The following items are specifically exceed from this sale: Nrmft 
. . . . . . . . . . . . - ~ - ~
u
* • - - • : • • • • < ; • ' • : ; • • \ * - ^ : : 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. N„||er represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price: 
n..._.. r-, :T r-i A^1___ DG aioT'triritv El connected 00 public sewer GQ connected/ < 
D septic jank D connected . 
D other sanitary system 
B public water S connected 
D private water D connected 
• well • connected* D other 
Q irriuAtlon water /secondary system 
# of ahitroc Company 
CJ TV antenna D master antenna • prewired 
fflnatuiaigas 09 connected 
H electrici y   
D . ingress & egress by private easement 
D dedicated road D paved 
El curb and gutter * 
• other rights " • " ' • 
(d) Survey. A certified survey B shall be f unwind at the expense oi S e l l e r prior to closing, • shall not be furnished. 
condition,except: as o u t l i n e d ]T parny rap1) 7 — - — - — ; "~ 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FIN/ (NCING. The m l purchase puce for the property is S l X ^ ^ ^ T f ! r ftIh°USan 
$. 
$ : 
1 0 0 , 0 0 which represents the aforeoescrlbed EARr^ST MONEY D^OSIT:-- . 
representing the approximate balance ot CA§H DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
Dollars ($ 6 4 f 0 0 0 . 0 0 _) which shall be paid as follows: 
representing tne appru*nii« M—.«..~w
 V, V^^,- , I ^ , , , , ,^,., . . t a , , . ._ „_ 
representing the approximate baitance of an exjsting mortgage, trust deed note,;real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears inter*** »i _ j _
 % p^ annumjwith monthly payments of $ ! . 
which include: D prince*. D inttM„8t; D taxes; D insurance; D condo fees; D other 
representing the approxima* bmlance ot * n additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which d&rtgmtion beam Interest at _____ ' " A1~ ,v———••«#« 
which include: • princes*. D intt»n*8t; • taxes 
% per annum with monthly payments of $. 
• • insurance; • condo fees; • other. 
wnicn inciuae: L_J yi n •»*••—. —- m " , , w i « —•• *~™n — 
^ i ^ a M L i l O representing balance, if an,. ,nr..»uding p.vn^eds from a new Wtgage loan, or seller financing, to be pa.d as follows: 
nf t i P " o f r.'.ns.-im?—i 4^-* •A 
___ 
Other 
$ 64.000.00 TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
- y e r i s r e q u i r e d , o a s s u m e a n U n d e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
to assume and/or procure same and this offer ,s n r f . .ub.ee to Buyer quahfymg for ^ ^ J ^ 8 u n J J n B o b l i g a t i o n and/or obtain the new financing a, 
to maKe app.ication within _ £ l Y £ days «~ Se.^r s acceptance of th,s « ^ * - £ £ > ^ Z J _ _ _ - _ f _ » * . after Seller's acceptance 
an interest rate not to exceed _2J> % " * " " ' * » » «« qualify for the assumpfon and/or ^ ^ ' "
 x | o a n dJscount 
o, this Agreement, this Agreement sha„ be voida.* ,- , e option „, the Seller ^ ^ J - . 8 ^ , ^ ^ ^ h e r loan costs. 
points, not to exceed S C 4 0 . 0 U • In **«»"n, se»e, ngrees to pay $ M 0 . 0 0 to be used y ( V Y f y 
c l , . . i „ f r - i » 4 ' - - i f - / ' i ™^-£-~20-?t Buyer's I n i t i a l s J ^ " ) . # ) 
Page two of a four page form Seller s lnt«it-<>•,•) (.--/ ) Datet_4= -^ 
Date] 
3. CONDITION AND C O N V ^ ^ C E OF TITLE, Setter represents thatj6el»er& holds title to the property in fee sim|_i B Is purchasing the property under a real 
estate contract Transfer of Setter ^ ownership interest shall be made as setforth In Section S. Seller agrees to furnish 900a and marketable title to the property, subject 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by* H a current'policy of title insurance liTthelimount of purchase price D an abstract of title brought current, 
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H). *1 ' * 
irty prior to closing. Buyer shall take ti 
" ~'s prior to signing this Agreement 
1 Buyer 
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:. 
None •- ~ 
Exceptions tq.Jhe above and Section C shall be limited to the following: 
None 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer te made subject to the following special conditions arid/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
prior to 1*1^ (10 Approval by buyer of xxaSma^t .structural, electrical, arid heatang systepis. 
(21 Approval bv/buverton condition df svdjomink^pool, (31 Buyer obtaining adequate financing 
at a rate of 9.5% or better. * " »>?» »* __, ^__________^_^ 
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be dosed on or before A p r i l 1 5 ..19 9T . at a reasonable location to be designated by 
Setter, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shalt deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of G_ date of possession D date of closing • other __ 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer «en a t C l O S l n g unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
.represents C ) Seller ( ) Buyer, 10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent 14cDoUgal - Q l s e n 
and the selling agent S o u t h Am P r o p e r t y M g m t . represents ( ) Seller (X) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
written disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her. {jfyftiS^ Buyer's initials 1W>) (£^i) Seller's initials. 
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVlSKW sifcTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME UMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
have until 5 : 0 0 (AMfffift F e b - 2 6 ,19 9 1
 r to accept this offef^ Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
MONEY to the Buyer. _^ / J 
//^Ikzc.M Jvr J J A y, 7-33.63 sn-u-
m _»:wu (A TPM)renM z.u 19___k_, to accc 
to the Buyer. / J 
Signature) _ ( D a t e ) J I er*s y?i (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
(Buyer's Signature) 
JL 
(Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE 
• ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Setter hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the tenns and conditions specified above. 
Q REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
\ ( l COUNTER OFFER. Setter hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until _ (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms 
soocified below ^ 
<e< frsc _ f '.S Hj*—1 U - t - / V _ — — — — J ' • ' < r W , I f I ( Y I J ,i. J. ,*_£ v ,^r "• — : — ; — 
* Z--Z^-^/ 6 tyg-ffrf . $?&> <t&jxL,ne*rf rfi& 8X& 
(Date) (Time) (Address) 
ffimftl ' ' fArlrlrAft&l 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
(Date) (Time) (Address) (Setter's Signature) 
CHECK ONE: 
D ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNtEft OFFER * 
. • REJECTION Buyer l\ereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. £ (Buyer's Initials) 
. B COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
IpQN. 
-s*. <T)crr\ (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement Bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed) 
1
 A. • I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures 
SIGNATURMF SEl ~ \W+4 
' SELLEI 
fov/T "Kfe< IT 
2--gg-9/ 
Date 
SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date 
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the • Seller Q Buyer. Sent by 





EARNEST^MONEY S/W3ES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) ' No (O) 
This is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
dow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
ters), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well.serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and ft meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
In Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. -
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defects) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing! Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
by such title insurance,company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
cancellation charge 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases 
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
043 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
DA/5C AMC n c A CTUIO D A ^ C C O Q U 
0»*0«TV«MTV 
K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS.« Buyer oMSeiler is a co>porationrpartnershiprfrist j estate., oVotherentity, the person executing this Agreement on Its behalf warrants 
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. " * "" " % j / ' ~ : , ~ ' " - ' * L \ - , 
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constftutes the_entire agreement between-the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings oragreements^between the^parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
ment. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. N r ' *' *;r v u - ' 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing, and, If attached hereto, shall incorporate alt the provisions of this Agreement 
not expressly modified or excluded therein. ~ *~; » 
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Sellerror If (his sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any .of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may. arise or accrue YronTenforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
plicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
terpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit retired to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the Interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting £arty shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
foes incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
O. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement. 
t 
P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the fcejler until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transactionTT Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair 
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
Q. TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates'. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
delivered by all parties to the transaction. 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (te) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing 
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 6. Unearned deposits'On tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
at closing. 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title "shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
cepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract,"Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
estate contract therein. 
T. NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of the event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect. If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the' 
Buyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice. 
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
V. DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays. 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1, 1987 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes: (X) a COUNTEROFFER ( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated t h e _ L 2 day of F f t h n i f l r y . 19 91 , between D a v i d fi— 
Stephanie Honrud asbuyer(s).and Dale fr Barbara Kersey asseiier(s). 
covering real property described as follows: 
542Q South Knollcrest, Mirray, Utah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
fll Sales price to be $67.000.00 (2) Approval by buyer on condition of 
qtnirtirral, electrical, and heating systems, and swimming pool will he 
provided by March 15, 1991, (5) Buyer obtaining adequate finaTiriTig nt a 
rate of 9.5% or better will remain as a contingency. 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. (X ) Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0 (A .M.^M 
February 26 IQ 91 to accept the terms speci f ied above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse. 
Date Signature of ( ) Seller ( X ) Buyer 
Time ' S . C O p r V \ (A.M./P.M.) ? ^ ^ A? ^ ' ^ 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
Check One 
(/§ I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT toe foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
f Signature s*Z^* Signature f \ Date 
( ) I hereby reject the fore"going (Initials) ^ 
Time 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signat an signatujes^ y^ 
re of Seller(sf /< ~DaYe s Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature ller(s) f*
( ) I personally caused a f inal copy of the foregoing bearing appropr iate signatures to be mailed Cm 
19 , by Cert i f ied Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Sent by 
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission 
' 053 
rii-cU IN ULfcNKo o m o c 
Salt Lake County Utah 
2 3 1992 
N e i l R. S a b i n ( 2 8 4 0 ) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3y. ~r^M k 3rd Dist Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH anaoiao 




DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
H - I - ^ Q - ^ I M C L ^ 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF PLAINTIFFS AND 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly for hearing on the 2nd day of March, 1992, before the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge, presiding. The Plaintiffs 
appeared by and through Patricia L. LaTulippe, their attorney, 
and the Defendants appeared by and through Franklin R. Brussow, 
their attorney. 
The Court has examined the pleadings and documents on file 
herein, including the respective affidavits submitted by the 
parties, and the documents on file herein, and heard oral 
argument by counsel. 
J/-4 
The Court, further, having found and concluded that the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, which is the subject of this 
action, is clear, unambiguous, and in full force and effect; that 
this subject contract includes an express warranty from the 
Defendants to the Plaintiffs as to the condition of the furnace; 
the Defendants not having submitted to the Court any facts or 
issues by Affidavit contradicting or countering the Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits and the clear and express language of the subject 
contract; and the Plaintiffs having incurred the cost of 
$1,100.00 to replace the defective, warranted furnace; and the 
Court otherwise having found that no dispute or issue of material 
facts exist in this case; and that, accordingly, the Plaintiffs 
are entitled by the express terms of the contract to Judgment 
against the Defendants; now, therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are 
granted Judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally: 
1. For $1,100.00. 
2. For Plaintiffs' costs incurred in this case. 
3. For reasonable attorneys fees to be determined by the 
Court, after submission by Plaintiffs to the Court and to 
Defendants' counsel of a detailed and itemized statement. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ day of W v g ^ c U , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
NE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
15699 - 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the xX day of 
March, 1992, addressed as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P. 0. 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
15699 - 3 -
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.O IN CLERK o u m u -
Salt Lake County Utah 
SEP 0 5 1992 
Clerk 3rd 0<st Gmt 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
HONRUD, 
: CIVIL NO, 910904831 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant 
to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Specifically, plaintiffs have moved for an award of attorney's 
fees and sanctions. In response, defendants filed a "Response 
to Motion Objection." Plaintiffs filed a reply to defendants' 
Response to Motion Objections and a Motion for Sanctions and a 
reply to defendants7 Response to Sanctions. 
Defendants requested a hearing on the motions, but they are 
not dispositive motions, and the Court does not deem oral 
argument necessary for the resolution of these issues. The 
Court, having considered plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees 
and costs, and for sanctions, the defendants' opposition 
thereto, and for good cause shown, hereby rules as follows. 
1 r4 
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HONRUD V. KERSEY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court has reviewed the attorney's fees and costs and 
finds that the attorney's fees and costs requested are 
reasonable and were necessarily incurred in this action. Thus, 
plaintiffs' motion in this action for attorney's fees and 
costs is granted with respect to plaintiffs' motion for 
sanctions, the Court finds that defendants' memorandum in 
opposition attempts to re-litigate matters already resolved in 
this case and are without merit and that it was not brought in 
good faith. Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion 
for sanctions and awards defendant additional attorney's fees 
in the amount of $200.00. 
Counsel for plaintiffs to prepare an Order consistent with 
this ruling. 
Dated this day of September, 1992,,, . XV'*~ 
ANNE M.'^  
DISTRICT * CQ0&SF'* JUDGE 
J. »-• ^  
HONRUD V. KERSEY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this ° day of September, 1992: 
Neil R. Sabin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Franklin R. Brussow 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
(ldX/utu« hM 
I Q C i 
J. - v-> 
Salt Lake County Utah 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SEP 2 ! 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE 
HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 




Civil No. 910904831 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
In this action, the Court granted Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and required that the Plaintiff submit a 
Statement of *Vttorneys Fees and Costs to the Court. On April 10, 
1992, Plaintiff submitted a statement to Defendants and to the 
Court. On May 8, 1992, Defendants filed a response and objection 
to the Plaintiffs' Motion for fees and costs. On May 18, 1992, 
Plaintiffs' filed a reply to the Defendants' Response and 
simultaneously filed a Motion for Sanctions. As the motions before 
the Court were not depositive, the Court deemed oral argument 
p.hon-ord 
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unnecessary for resolution• The Court, having examined the 
pleadings and documents on file herein, including Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs and for Sanctions, the 
Defendants' opposition thereto, and for good cause shown, hereby 
finds Plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs to be reasonable and 
necessarily incurred in this action• The Court also finds that the 
Defendants ' Memorandum in Opposition attempts to relitigate matters 
already resolved in this case, is without merit, and not brought in 
good faith. Now, therefore, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are granted 
judgment against Defendant, jointly and severally, for their 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs as submitted to the Court in 
the amount of Four Thousand One Hundred Fifty-One Dollars 
($4,151.00) as attorneys fees and Two Hundred Thirteen Dollars 
Forty-Three Cents ($213.43) as costs. In addition, Plaintiffs are 
granted their Motion for Sanctions and awarded an Order and 
judgment against counsel for the Defendants, individually and 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) as attorneys fees. 
DATED this >^(*bV day of V - ^ V ^ ^ W ^ 1992 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUD 
p.hon-ord 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
caused to be served upon: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P.O. 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
Case No. C 910704831 
JUDGE STIRBA 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOWf # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 




2. Denied, for the reason that same is untrue, since a 
counter-offer was tendered to Plaintiffs on or about 20 February 1991, 
which was purportedly accepted by the Plaintiffs on or about 22 
February 1991. 
3. Denied, for the reason that same is untrue, Defendants having 
expressly refused to extend any warranty to Plaintiffs, buyers, and 
having specifically counter-offered in their own hand to Plaintiffs, 
in lieu of any warranty, a right of inspection for Plaintiffs, limited 
in time, and supported by consideration in the form of a price 
reduction for the said refutation of any warranty. 
4. Admitted, in part, 
warranty or "representation 
Plaintiffs' own agent, sin 
Defendants' counter-offer wh 
the condition of the premi 
limitation, had the premises 
who certified to Plaintiff 
and on whose representation 




ich was in 1 
ses, and, in 
and furnace 
s the fitne 
of fitness 
tion in the 
that Plaintiffs relied on any 
adhesion contract drafted by 
fs abided by the limitation in 
ieu of any warranty concerning 
conformity with the aforesaid 
inspected by their own expert 
ss of the premises and furnace 
the Plaintiffs actually relied 
counter-offer they accepted. 
5. Neither admitted nor denied as to when Plaintiffs made 
physical entry into or occupied the subject premises for lack of 
Defendants' knowledge and Plaintiffs are left to their proofs, however 
Plaintiffs admit a business record purports that a Mountain Fuel 
representative refused to re-light the subject furnace on or about 20 
April 1991. 
6. Denied, for the reason that same is untrue there being no 
indication in any Mountain Fuel business record that the subject 
furnace was releasing any "toxic gas", known and identified, nor that 
the furnace was defective, or beyond repair, if repair was necessary. 
It does appear that some presently unknown person of questionable 
expertise purported to find a "flame disturbance" of unspecified 
causation. Exhibit A. 
7. Denied, for the reason that same is untrue, said furnace 
being found in proper and serviceable condition when same was cleaned 
and serviced prior to the 1990-1991 heating season by an experienced 
furnace service person hired by Plaintiffs and also when Defendants' 
own expert inspected the furnace in acceptance of the express 
limitation contained in Defendants' counter-offer. Additionally, 
Plaintiffs and their adopted son used the furnace up to and until the 
date set for closing and suffered no toxic effects, the furnace being 
in satisfactory working condition on the closing date. 
8. Denied, for the reason that this allegation is logically and 
factually inconsistent since Exhibit A is dated 20 April 1991, and 
since Plaintiffs waited almost thirty days before purportedly sending 
a letter to Defendants on 17 May 1991 concerning the purported 
"dangerous" condition. Defendants had amicably agreed upon Defendants 
inquiry subsequent to the closing to demonstrate for Defendants how to 
operate the swimming pool, sprinkler system and digital furnace 
thermostat. Defendants appeared at the pre-arranged time, but 
Plaintiffs were absent and Defendants returned at a later date to 
gratuitously assist Defendants, who made absolutely no reference to 
the furnace being unsatisfactory. Still later, when Defendants 
responded with instruction to assist Plaintiffs in understanding the 
correct use of the refrigerator upon Plaintiffs' complaint, there was 
no mention of any problem with the furnace. 
9. Denied, for the reason that even if Plaintiffs' inspector's 
appraisal that the furnace was in satisfactory working can be proved 
to be negligent and the furnace was not in satisfactory working 
condition at closing, Plaintiff's are not entitled to the brand new 
furnace, or the eleven hundred dollars ($1,100.00), they have been, 
and are now, attempting to wrongfully dun Defendants to provide under 
threat of suit and liability for attorney fees. Plaintiff's would only 
be entitled to the repairs necessary to make the existing furnace 
function satisfactorily, or to a used furnace that could so function. 
10. Denied, for the reason that clause Nf as would all terms of 
the agreements between Plaintiffs and Defendants as drafted by 
Plaintiffs, shall be construed against Plaintiffs and relates only to 
failure to consumate the closing and instances where there is a 
recission of the contract. Further denied, for Defendants in good 
01 1 
faith sought to resolve the controversy without litigation while 
Plaintiff s in bad faith utilized counsel to gouge Defendants for an 
entirely new furnace, dunned Defendants through counsel with threats 
of the imposition attorney fees, made false representations of fact to 
Defendants which caused Defendants to doubt Plaintiffs1 counsel's 
veracity and to be wary of Plaintiffs, and the Defendants were 
over-reached by Plaintiffs' counsel who refused to reasonably respond 
to Defendants1 correspondence that sought to ascertain whether the 
condition of furnace was as Plaintiffs and their counsel represented 
before making overtures to fix or replace said furnace with a 
satisfactory used furnace or to stand on Defendants1 rights to have 
Plaintiff sustain the burden of proof. Plaintiffs' rush to the 
courthouse is not reasonable and was unnecessary, hence attorney fees 
for such activity are unreasonable. Should the reasonable attorney 
fees portion of clause N apply, mutuality of remedies would require 
Plaintiffs to pay Defendants' reasonable attorney fees when Defendants 
prevail. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court hold 
Plaintiffs' claim for naught, dismiss same as no cause of action, and 
award Defendants their costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys/fees 
so wrongfully incurred in defending this matter. 
COUNT 2 
12. Defendants incorporate by reference as if fully set forth 
herein paragraghs 1-11 above. 
13. Denied, for the reason that same is untrue, since a 
counter-offer was tendered to Plaintiffs on or about 20 February 1991, 
which was purportedly accepted by the Plaintiffs on or about 22 
February 1991. 
14. Admitted, as did Defendants. 
15. Denied, for the reason that same is untrue. 
16. Denied, for the reason that even if Plaintiffs could possibly 
prove the furnace was in unsatisfactory condition at or before the 
closing Plaintiff's are only entitled to a furnace in satisfactory 
working condition not a brand new furnace, or the $1,100.00 
unreasonably demand and which the Plaintiffs wrongfully sought to 
intimidate Defendants to provide through Plaintiffs' counsel. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court hold 
Plaintiffs' claim for naught, dismiss same as no cause of action, and 
award Defendants their costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys fees 
so wrongfully incurred in defending this matter. 
012 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action. 
2. Plaintiffs1 contract is one of adhesion and such contract 
also must be construed against Plaintiffs1 draftors thereby precluding 
recovery. 
3. The express terms of Defendants' counter-offer as accepted by 
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs1 course of dealing in reliance thereon 
exclude any assertion of any warranty, since Plaintiffs purchased the 
property in reliance upon the satisfactory results of their own 
inspection. 
4. Plaintiffs have failed to join an indispensable party who is 
bound to make contribution for the losses purportedly sustained by 
Plaintiffs should Plaintiffs be able to prove the purported 
unsatisfactory condition of the furnace existed at closing. 
5. In the alternative Defendants reserve the right to assert the 
mutual mistake of the parties as to the condition of the furnace and 
mutual mistake as to the existence of a warranty of said furnace 
requiring the equitable recission of the contract between innocent 
parties. 
6. Upon completion of discovery Defendants reserve the right to 
add additional affirmative or special defenses. 
7. Upon completion of discovery Defendants reserve the right to 
implead third parties to make contribution to, or indemnify Defendants 
for, any judgment which might be obtained in this matter, as well as 
the right to file such cross-claims against Defendants1 real estate 
agent as may become warranted. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendants hereby demand a trial by jury. 
28 August 1991 
FRANKLIN RICHARD ^ frkUSSOW 
Attorney for Defendants 
')t 
Form 184 MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
* . ^ -r- . ^ t- Order No 
N O T I C E 
Name Address ^r^o A, l~*-££s: u^r rt?> 
Your ' O c L ^ > ^ / <j£tu^xs —/? 
has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off 
at f^:/f AM.,<Pjp> because ^ ^ ^ < ? 
This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the 
above appliance has been inspected for or is free of any defect other than 
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating 
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection. 
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed, 
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone £ / C ^ ^ ^ " ^ 
Signed — 
Serviceman 
s y; . " / / , / . 
Signature 
Customer'  ; y/ , / 
EXHIBIT A 
Salt L ? , ^ County Utah 
,°:D 23 1991 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF S&LT LAKE 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE STIRBA 
fk >rd Dot Court 
DPOHtv r^ 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS SAY THAT, without admission of responsibilty or contractual 
or other liability, Defendants hereby offer to Plaintiffs to have the 
device which is the subject of the above-entitled matter repaired by 
welding to achieve satisfactory operation, or, in the alternative, 
Plaintiffs offer to pay to Defendants the sum of ninety-five dollars 
($95.00), either as full satisfaction of any and all claims against 
Plaintiffs associated with, arising out of or which could arise out of 
the above-entitled matter. 
20 September 1991 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW 
Attorney for Defendants 
p^^V .v 
1 7 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT 
FllB>IH3THiSyc0tfliT 
Third JucSicls? District 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
By. 
WF -1 1991 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE STIRBA 
WutyCterk 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS SAY THAT, without admission of responsibility or 
contractural or other liability, Defendants hereby offer to pay 
to Plaintiffs some of three hundred, seventy-five dollars 
($375.00), as full satisfaction of any and all claims against 
Plaintiffs associated with, or arising out of or which could 
arise out of the above-entitled matter. 
Date: 1 October 1991 \fU6a*t&^ 
FRANKLIN RICHAXB BRUSSOW 
Attorney for Defendants 
~IS.-£D 
D l a . n i O T O O U R T 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUIJIY
 QOFy S&LT LAKE 
»5T 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
fcWOFFER OF JUDGMENT 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE STIRBA 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS SAY THAT, without admission of responsibilty or contractual 
or other liability, Defendants hereby offer to pay to Plaintiffs the 
sum of four hundred and twenty-five dollars ($425.00), which, when 
coupled with the $125.00 the Plaintiffs have taken back from their 
inspector, is half the price of a new furnace installed pursuant to 
the replacement bid provided by Plaintiff to Defendants. 
/ 
30 October 1991 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW 
Attorney for Defendants 
r. 1 U 
' . O " > • -
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STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR THE 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
COUNTY jOT SALT ^LAKE 
w
 o m rjj "3/ 
Br— ,Cs^Zs&~f~~z^ 
RESPONSE TO MOtlOJf FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ' 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO URCP 56 
060 
DEFENDANTS SAY: 
1. A jury trial was demanded in this case by Defendants so that 
admissable, relevant and material factual determinations may be 
decided by a panel of ordinary, reasonable people and justice 
delivered by these peers in Court. URCP 43 (a). 
2. Genuine issues of material fact exist that are unresolved by 
Plaintiff's affidavit, are squarely rebutted by Defendants' 
counter-affidavit and Plaintiffs bear the burden of providing a 
preponderance of reliable and admissable evidence in order to prevail 
in this matter. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment may not be supported 
by a legally proscribed affidavit containing of out of Court 
statements made by a un-named declarants offered as evidence to prove 
the matters purportedly expressed since it is well recognized in the 
antiquity of American and English jurisprudence that such statements 
are inadmissable and unfit for submission to the trier of fact as 
obviously lacking intrinsic reliability, especially when the opponent 
is denied the fundamental due process protection of confrontation 
embodied in the right to cross-examine the declarant as a witness 
under oath in Court. Utah RE 802; URCP 56 (e) and 43 (a) & (b). 
4. The submission of inadmissable hearsay to a trier of fact is 
strictly proscribed by Utah Rule of Evidence 802 as inherently 
unreliable and a circumvention of the right to cross-examine the 
purported declarant under oath at trial. 
5. Plaintiffs' affidavit sets forth numerous out of Court 
statements of un-named declarants who were not not subject to oath 
when they purportedly said the inadmissable hearsay Plaintiffs' 
espouse in their supporting affidavit, "Averments 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 
22, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 24." In fact, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B (Averment 
7) does not corroborate the existence of a "large split" or "the 
release of toxic gas" as set forth as the unsubstantiated and unsworn 
hearsay of an admittedly unknown declarant - Averment 12. 
6. Plaintiffs' affidavit avers out of Court statements of other 
declarants that are not made upon Plaintiffs' own personal knowledge, 
the "averments " set forth above in paragragh 5 are clearly hearsay 
and inadmissable as evidence according to Utah RE 802, 801, and URCP 
56 (e) and Plaintiffs are not competent to testify as witnesses, 
expert or otherwise, as to the truth of those "facts" set forth in the 
affidavit. 
7. Plaintiffs Averment 22 is strangely absent a paid invoice for 
the new furace Plaintiff's demanded from the onset and the affidavit 
of Plaintiffs' counsel is likewise absent the breakdown of hourly 
services allegedly provided especially where Plaintiff's counsel 
purported in writing that her accumulated fees before generating the 
Motion for Summary Judgment were $1,400.00. 
oei 
Plaintiffs' affidavit was made in bad faith, clearly and 
obviously contrary to the express requirements of URCP 56 (e) and RE 
802, to avoid the recognition that Plaintiffs1 lack the necessary 
proofs to prevail at trial in this matter, as an unwarranted and 
clearly unsupported procedural attempt to strip the Defendants of 
their right to a fair trial, and to needlessly and wastefully increase 
the expense and costs to the Defendants and delay the trial of this 
matter. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court: 
a. deny Plaintiffs'Motion for Summary Judgment in toto; and 
b. order an award to be paid to Defendants by Plaintiffs of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the Plaintiffs1 
affidavit caused Defendants to incur, including reasonable 
attorney's fees pursuant to URCP 56 (g) before Plaintiffs be 
permitted to proceed any further with the above-encaptioned 
matter. / / „ *-*'<T? ~ 
DATE: 23 December 1991 .. -••— y' L/Z S!>CKA / JC>C U; SJ ' V T ^ C ^ ^ V 
FRANKLIN RICHARD ^RUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT iAKE 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
AFFIANT SAYS: 
1. I am a Defendant and the Seller of my home in 5420 South 
Knollcrest, Salt Lake City to Plaintiffs above. 
2. At no time did I offer to warrant a furnace at that 
residence, nor did I so warrant. In the adhesion Offer to Purchase, 
Contingency 1(e) drafted by the Plaintiffs/Purchasers, Plaintiffs 
expressly accepted the property which is the subject of the sale 
according to paragraph 7. 
3. It was my understanding that paragraph 7 was expressly 
drafted and included to clearly supersede the general boilplate 
language and adhesive provisions of Plaintiffs* form contract. 
4. This contract should be construed against Plaintiffs, because 
of the inherent confusion caused by the contradictions of Contingency 
1(e) negating warranties, written counter-offer of 20 February 1991 
under paragraph 12 of the agreement, "as is" paragraph B of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and Plaintiffs' mainfest acceptance of 
that inspection contingency in lieu of warranties by hiring an expert 
inspector before closing contrasted with paragraph C of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement and the circuituous contradiction of paragraph 
6. 
5. Paragraph 7 abrogated any warranty and provided Plaintiffs 
the right to have the property inspected by an expert to assure the 
fitness of the premises and Plaintiff's availed themselves of this 
right shortly before the closing, finding the property fit as it was. 
6. The handwritten counter-offer under paragragh 12 also negated 
the provision of any warranty and that Plaintiffs were bound to take 
the subject propery subject to their own inspection and ALL 
contingencies were expressly removed before closing so that sale would 
be a clean deal and I would have no subsequent contingencies 
associated with the sale to linger into the future. 
7. That paragragh 6 says "None" and "None" was a further 
assurance in my mind that there were no warranties that would be a 
subsequent contingency to drag me back into a closed deal. 
8. I expressed to the realtor that the sale was to be "as is" so 
the matter would be ended with the sale and further lowered the price 
to the point where I made no profit to close the matter with no loose 
ends like the subsequent operation of contingencies like a lingering 
warranty. 
9. On knowledge and belief, Plaintiff's were assured by their 
expert that the home and the furnace were in proper working order by 
their expert, relied on same, and later forced the expert/inspector to 
return the fee paid the inspector through Plaintiffs1 attorney. 
10. The furnace was in satisfactory working condition when the 
gas to the premises was turned off on the day set for the closing. 
11. The furnace was clean and serviced in November of 1990 by Mr. 
Sorenson a reputable furnace service person who found the furnace to 
be in proper working condition and I lived on the premises safely with 
my wife and our newly adopted child. 
12. I netted no profit from the sale of this premises which I 
bought in 1983 and only sold the home when it became too small upon 
our adoption of a Korean child. 
13. After the sale I responded immediately to Plaintiffs 
complaint about the refrigerator and reminded Plaintiffs that stocking 
a refrigerator with warm food from the store requires a reasonable 
period of time for the refrigerator to overcome the warmth and 
maintain the cold. 
14. After the closing I agreed to come to the premises to show 
the Plaintiff's how the sprinkler system, swimming pool system and 
digital thermostat worked. 
15. In spite of my efforts to assist the Plaintiffs, they waited 
more than thirty days after purportedly discovering the alleged defect 
in the furnace and never contacted me to negotiate a reasonable 
resolution to the purported problem. Instead Plaintiffs hired an 
attorney who demanded a brand new furnace, threatened to sue me, and 
indicated I would have to pay for her fees. This letter was sent to 
the realtor not directly to me. 
16. Upon being dunned like this I became suspicious, and the 
attorneys lack of candor in the responses to my correspondence only 
made me more skeptical. Exhibit A contains the reasonable efforts I 
made to resolve this matter short of litigation. 
17. After mailed correspondence dated 15 July 1991, EXHIBIT A, to 
Plaintiffs' counsel indicating that Plaintiffs' own inspector had 
found no defect and waited for a response. I heard nothing. 
064 
18. On or about 13 August 1991 Plaintiffs' counsel sued me, and I 
was forced to hire an attorney to defend me on a matter which could 
have been negoitated between the parties. 
19. My attorney made reasonable efforts to negotiate this matter 
to an economical conclusion, EXHIBIT B, however Plaintiffs' demanded 
of me more and more money for Defendants' attorneys putting a 
settlement out of reach. 
20. Offers of Judgment were served on Plaintiffs to no avail, 
which included up to half the price of a brand new furnace for this 
thirty-three year old, or so, home. 
21. After the sale was concluded and Plaintiff's bought the house 
which was originally listed at $71,900.00 for $67,000.00, Plaintiffs 
wish to chisel out a better deal, when a complaint about the purported 
condition of the furnace can no longer be negotiated in consideration 
of the sale price of the premises and Plaintiffs unfairly continue to 
demand a brand new furnace and exorbitant attorney fees. 
22. Plaintiffs' counsel assessed her attorneys fees at $1,400.00 
before she filed Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, EXHIBIT B, 
but now states her fees have swollen to $3,620.50. At $75.00 per hour 
that would be about 29.5 to submit a simple motion for summary 
judgment. 
23. Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit no where indicates on what 
date, what service was purportedly performed and how much time each 
service purportedly consumed, nor if counsel, a law clerk or paralegal 
performed such services. 
STATE OF UTAH 
}ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
DALE B. KERSEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I have 
read the paragraghs above, and if called as a witness have personal 
knowledge of those facts contained therein and can testify they are 
true, except as to those stated to be upon knowledge and belief, and 
as to those facts I believe them to be true. 
; & ** >% 
/ ^ Commission v ' \\ 
( Expires July 2,1992 
JANYCEA.SYNDERGAARD 
Subscribed and sworn to 
before me, a Notary Public, 
on 23 December 1991 
lotary Public 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
My Commission Expires: 
n n -; 
Ju±y i J f i77i 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
Mis!sen 4 Seriior 
Suite 1100 Eagle Gate Flaza 
60 E South Temple 
Dear Us, 
.a t ui i poe * 
i taixec -Mivn torn r'hi^ios wztn ;±±, aria he state*: ne reporter in nis 
inspection thav the furnace *as in average condition* He also statec to m* 
that, mile even using mirrors during his inspection
 t he lid not see any 
flame disturbance or any other problem with the furnace. This inspection 
supports the save fincmgs as that of the company I haa clean and service 
the furnace in November of last "/ear. 
•j i n c e r e i v
 1 
Barbara & Dale Kersey 
cc: Mr, & Hrs. Hon rue 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT 
0 6G A/-/& 
Jul/ S, 1991 
Patricia L. LsTjiippe 
Nisisan %> Senior 
Suits 11CO Eagl= Eate clazi 
60 £ 5cutf. Temple 
t L=fe Ci-/, Li S o * - .sf fc! L/I V, _- C*t-i 
Dear Us, LaTulipps: 
I aE'SH /cu in »ii> Letter dates Ijra 7:h 1991, ZQ prisms i-e «:" 
address BHC prions n^mDer CT the inspector the Hcn^uc = ri^ec tc inspect n-
nou.se orior TO sale. Your letter aated Jane list has z^e name z* the 
company as "Til" anc an address of "iOZf East Eth £ G L " " . Trz»-z is ^c 
mention o+ cit/ or even a ohons -nj^be^' 
I f-iec to lool- the* uc in m> phcre boo s~c co-Ic not -in: s~ - listing :-
eitns- the white pages or the yellow cages. I tried A""-."* ir-:T,5:::r ana 
the onlv list:rg tne> had tin Utah* ^a= -or a comoen* m Sunset at 77C Ecge 
Hill Drive. I cslled tnem at S85~44fo and was toic tr.e-- were a" >austr:el 
Cc-sf-ucticn Company d«ild:nc pcwe-" plants z~3 die nc: do nc.se :nspectiora, 
"lease provide me wit" the comolete indorsation I *-e ceen as-:-g i r so ens-
I can Tina c-t the information I need to ir^e sure c+ m> necessa-v actions. 
Please ^espeno qjiirly to this second request, 
Smce-eU , 
Ba^oara y Dale r e-"sey 
ccs Mr. ?< Mrs. .^ on^ ad 
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Arthur H. Nielsen 
Gary A. Weston 
Earl Jay Peck 
Neil R. Sabin 
Milton J. Morris** 
R. Dennis lckes»t 
Mark H. Anderson* 
B. Kent Ludlow 
Richard M. Hymas 
John K. Mangum 
Richard K. Hincks 
Noel S. Hyde 
Robert P. Faust 
Jay R. Mohlman 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Larry L. Whyte* 
Steven F. All red© 
Amy A. Jackson 





^ y Attorneys & Counselors 
Since 1882 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
July 10, 1991 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C. Garner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
© Arizona 
* California 
+ Navajo Bar 
* New York 
* Washington, D.C. 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
6942 Well Spring Road 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Dear Mr. and Ms. Kersey: 
Please excuse the typo on my l a s t l e t t e r . The inspect ion 
company i s TCI, The Complete Inspection. I t i s located a t 1025 
East 8th South in Sal t Lake City, Utah. The telephone number 
l i s t e d in the yellow pages under "Inspection Service" i s 328-
9083. 
Sincerely, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
P a t r i c i a LaTulippe 
PLH/ts 
enc l . 
13293.H0583.PLH 
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Arthur H. Nielsen 
Gary A. Weston 
Earl jay Peck 
Neil R. Sabin 
Milton J. Morris** 
R. Dennis lckes«t 
Mark H. Anderson* 
8. Kent Ludlow 
Richard M. Hymas 
John K. Mangum 
Richard K. Hincks 
Noel S. Hyde 
Robert P. Faust 
Jay R. Mohlman 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Larry L. Whyte • 
Steven F. All red© 
Amy A. Jackson 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
NIELSEN 
S&ENIOR 
\^J Attorneys & Counselors 
Since 1882 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
Ju ly 8, 1991 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C. Garner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
® Arizona 
* California 
t Navajo Bar 
* New York 
* Washington, D.C. 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
6942 Well Spring Road 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Dear Mr. and Ms, Kersey: 
On the day the Honruds moved in, they were told by Mountain 
Fuel that the furnace was unsafe and inoperable. They bargained 
for a functioning furnace and are merely trying to get what they 
paid for. They are not out to gouge anyone. 
We have indicated that the property is available for your 
inspection. The Honruds only ask that they be given 24 hours 
notice. As I represented in the June 21, 1991 letter, we do not 
feel it necessary to have other service people present at the 
time of your inspection. If after you have had the furnace 
inspected, a question remains as to the operative condition of 
the furnace, we will obtain another opinion at that time. 
Letters back and forth restating the same position will not 
solve the problem. We expect an inspection to be conducted and a 
resolution within five (5) days from receipt of this letter. If 
this does not occur, we will immediately file a complaint with 
the court. Let me reiterate that we would prefer to resolve this 
out of court. 
Sincerely, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 




Jul> 4, 1991 
Patricia L. LaTuiippe 
Nielsen b Senior 
Suits liOO Eagie Gate Flaza 
60 E South Temple 
Salt Lale City, UT 84111 
Lear pis, LaTuIippe; 
I have receive- information cont^ar/ to year letter of JLPS 21, 1991, 
indicating Mctntam Fuel was at the property after the first tu*r or- .isit, 
It is important we be forthright abcit thi = 'T.atte-, si-ce I 5m ccrce^-ec 
about oemg go^gec fo-~ a ne* furnace. 
v^ihy ie Mountair Fuel bac? pedaling. The notice only ma^es claim some 
Mountain Fuel -vorJs"- of questionable acilit/ fcunc a "-lame disturoance,,{ 
not 5 to iz leal- , or damaged casing. It i= also clea5-* Jritsn Furnace wenc = 
to sell, and install a new furnace -atrier then f:; ing the ole one. 
Can TI2 indicate *ren this o-acl- ccu-^ed. wn\ jidn t ""II *epc^t cr ictice 
the crec1. Can ^CLntair FUEI " fty -urnzce =6-v:cs pe^sc- QPse*"\ec nc 
crac^. 
I believe it is important to ^av^ all tnose people presert *ho rendered 
opinions concerning tne furnece and its unrepai"-aoilit> to reach a consensus 
on this -natter. 
Do you tia^/e any suggestions concerning such a meeting"* Concerning ancche--
opinion, the burden ne^e is not on me. Aisc undef- t~e contract tre hon^.ds 
wculq be liable for all costs in resolving c m s .natte^ i+ /ou and tie/ a^e 
wrong. Incidentally, I am merely required to proviae a furnace that wc-->=, 
if you are correct or prevail, not a new +urr.ac5. Also, we may need to 
discuss the potential of my na\ing the prope^t/ taci- , si~ce both tne ronr_.es 
and ourselves may have oeen miatafen about the ^jr-acs and I wotld not ^ave 
discounted the listed price, as deeoly as I did, if I l new it *a= going tc 
cost me one thousand dollars for a new furnace. 
It nas tal-er you two wee!- a to respond tc m> lette^ c* J m e 7? 1*91. 
Sincerely, 
Dale t Barbara Jersey 
:c. Curtia flcDougal McDougal 01 ae" Realty 
Jim Pod--ig_ei South Am F_operty hanadsment 
Dave axe* Stephanie Honrud 
n 7 r> 
NIELSEN 
SENIOR x5g Attorneys & Counselors 
Since 1882 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Gary A. Weston 
Earl Jay Peck 
Neil R. Sabin 
Milton J. Morris** 
R. Dennis lckes«+ 
Mark H. Anderson* 
B. Kent Ludlow 
Richard M. Hymas 
John K. Mangum 
Richard K. Hincks 
Noel S. Hyde 
Robert P. Faust 
Jay R. Mohlman 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Larry L. Whyte • 
Steven F. Allred® 
Amy A. Jackson 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
June 21, 1991 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
6942 Well Spring Road 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
UNITED STATES (&(*& 
POSTAL SERVICE \ * - » « « * 
i? l | ID? 1 7 1 
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Return Receipt Showing to Whom. 
Daie. 3. Address of Delivery 
Dear Dale and Barbara: 
discovered that Mountain 
Upon inquiryf I have QISCUVCICU *^ 
will not supply the name of the inspector or allow him to 
come out to the property again. However, this should not 
impede our settlement because we have their notice of 
discontinuance which makes clear there is a problem with 
the furnace. We can verify the specific problem by private 
inspection. 
In answer to the questions raised in the June 7, 1991 
lecter, both the furnace inspector from Mountain Fuel and 










the representative from United 
Conditioning, who submitted a bid 
replacement, indicated that there was a crack in 
furnace casing. As to the type of gas escaping, we do 
know anymore than rhat "che Kouncaiu Fuel representative 
indicated it was toxic. TIC, 1025 East "8th South, 
performed the initial inspection before purchase 
Provision #7 which provides for approval by the buyer -
the structural, electrical and heating systems does 
negate your express warranty that the heating system would 




The Honruds will make the property avai 
inspection upon 24 hours notice from you. You can arrange 
to have a furnace service representative inspect the 
furnace to verify the problem. We expect this inspection 
to take place within the next seven (7) days. We dc 
feel it necessary to have other service people present 






dispute t j n f l L u ^ opinion and go
will need to obtain, anot^er^ndepend^ ^ P ^
 f u r n a c e 
"there. However, let me 
071 6 
"as is" is not functional, i.e. Mountain Fuel will not turn 
it on, and that under the contract you are liable for the 
costs in resolving this matter. 
Sincerely, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
PLH/ts 
June 7, 1991 
Patricia L. LaTuuppe 
Nielsen & Senior 
Suite 1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
50 E South Temple 
Salt Lake city*, UT 34111 
Dear Ms. LaTulippe: 
Although the temperature has turned to a delightful 30 degrees, due to the 
serious nature of the problem, we are responding to your letter in a timely 
manner, working towards a fast resolution. 
We requested of you to furnish us immediately with the name and phone number 
of the person who represented to you that the furnace was emitting toxic 
gas. Your second letter does not include this information and it was the 
Qiiij thing I asked of you. Please provide this- information immediately. If 
you would have furnished us this information with your first letter, we 
could have responded more satisfactorily. You did provide us with a copy of 
the Mountain Fuei Notice of Discontinuance, but it provides no name of the 
inspector. Also the Notice of Discontinuance states only "Flame 
disturbance," says nothing about a large crack down the middle of anything 
or the fact that it is releasing any toxic gas. What is cracked? what was 
We also request you at this time to furnish us with the name, address and 
phone number of the Hcnrud's inspector, who they had inspect the house upon 
their demand. According to the Ernest Money Agreement, the sale of the 
house was pending upon "approval by buyer of condition of structural, 
electrical, and heating systems," which was accepted by the Honruds when 
they closed. Wouldn't the Hcnrud's inspector have noticed such an obvious 
infirmity as a large crack? 
The special, express language in Clause 7 supersedes the form language in 
Clause C. The Honruds chose the inspection expressly in lieu of the 
warranty in Clause C. Why would the Honruds need the assurance D£ the 
warranty, since they chose instead to have their inspector inspect the 
premises to certify its fitness, why aren't you seeking compensaticn from 
the expert inspector on whose assurances they relied? 
We are interested in resciving this matter and would appreciate your prompt 
response to our requests listed above. Also, you can arrange a joint 
inspection so I might have your inspector, the Mountain Fuei employee, and 
I will have the furnace service representative, who I had service arA sdjus: 
this furnace on November 17, 1990, there also. 
Sincerely, 
Barbara h Dale Kersey 
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Dale and Barbara Kersey 
6942 Well Spring Road 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Kersey: ' _
 i 
Due to the serious nature of the problem and the need for a fast 
resolution, the Honruds have asked for my assistance. 
In response to your concerns raised in your letter, the Earnest Money 
Agreement, although provided by the Honrud's agent, was signed by you and 
is a binding contract. You are correct in your reference to clause #7 and 
clause B. However, clause B provides that buyer accepts the property "as 
is" subject to the warranties in Section 6. Section 6 encompasses the 
warranties contained in Section C. As I explained in my first letter, 
you, the seller, warrant in Section C that the heating system is sound or 
in satisfactory working condition, which it is not. Therefore, you are in 
breach of the warranty you gave to the Honruds. 
Mountain Fuel informed Honruds that the furnace was releasing toxic 
gas, had a large crack down the middle and was not functional or safe in 
that condition. Copies of both Mountain Fuel's Notice of Discontinuance 
and United Furnace's estimation of replacement were enclosed in che first 
letter. 
You can contact both Mountain Fuel and United Furnace to verify the 
condition of the furnace. You can also engage your own people to inspect 
the furnace and we will make the premises available. The Honruds are very 
much interested in resolving this matter and appreciate your prompt 





-;1ay 31, 2 991 
Dave arid Stephanie Honrud 
5420 Knoll Crest 
Hurray, UT 34107 
Dear ilr, ana Mrs, Honrud and Attorney : 
It is unfortunate that you did not contact me immediately concern ing the 
purported "disturbance" at the premises, 1 received your letter dated the 
17th of Hay, postmarked the 25th of May* on the 30th of Hay* at my residence 
of 69^2 tie 11 Spring Road* Hid vale, Utah 34047, advising me 1 nave 7 cays t :> 
respond. This causes me to question your intent from to onset, 
In the pastf you contacted me concern ing the refrigerator anc amicably 
resolved that misconception you had. Then you contacted me about the where 
abouts of one of the garage door openers anc that matter was also resolved 
to your satisfaction. Now, without contacting me at all* you choose to run 
off to an attorney and incur that expense unreasonably with no contact to me 
at all. tihat is most strange anc unsettling is that 1 readily made the 
premises available for your inspection an c v o u in fact had your e x D e r t 
certify to you the soundness of the premises, including the heating system 
and the pool (see dlause #7), When you hao experienced a misunderstanding 
as to the operation of the pool system, 1/ although having no obligation to 
you, came over and instructed you properly* At the same time I instructec 
you on how the sprink1er system worked and how to program the t imer, p1us I 
also instructed you on how to program the heating system thermostat. 
You purchased the premises "as is" (see clause 3). You availed yourself of 
such an inspect ion and relied on the reoresentaiions of that inspector. If 
1 were aware of any defect in the heating system* which I used safely anc 
without incident all winter, J would have had the deficiency repaired anc 
mearly added it into the purchase price. 
1 had the house listed for $69*500 and sold it to you for $67,000, a 
reduction based on your s and your expert"s inspection of premise. Ycu 
knew, or should have known, this house was approximately more than 30 -/ears 
old, yet you demand a new heater anc offer no contribution to its purchase 
and installation, 
four attorney says that "the furnace was re leasing toxic gas," 1 used the 
•"'urnace approximately 7 years with no incident and certainly would not have 
exposed my wife and chosen child to any danger. 
0 7 5 Cf 
Please tell me who represented to you that this furnace was emitting toxic 
gas. Are they willing to testify vo thai- in a court of law? I wish vo make 
inquiry of that person to ascertain whether the furnace is beyond repair* 
You don't junk an automob ile because it needs new tires. 
Incidentally, the emest money document was provideo by your agent and 
completed by him. Please provioe me the information I seek ana lets resolve 
your proolem reasonably in a fashion like che other demands you have vade on 
me after the deal was closed. Please correspond iR^tiLiiilLS. t»ith me 
concerning this, the heating season is over. 
Sincere 1y, 
Da 1 e dt 3ar bar a Ker se y 
cc: Curtis >1cDouaal 
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^J Attorneys & Counselors 
Since 1882 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
May 17, 1991 
A Professional Corporation 
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925) 
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C. Garner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T. Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
® Arizona 
* California 
t Navajo Bar 
* New York 
* Washington, D.C 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
c/o Curtis McDougal 
McDougal-Olsen Construction 
1588 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Re: Sale of home at 5420 S. Knollcrest 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Kersey: 
We are representing Dave and Stephanie Honrud concerning the 
real estate transaction between you and them. Shortly after 
closing when the Honruds attempted to have Mountain Fuel turn on 
the gas, they discovered the furnace to be in an unfit and 
dangerous condition. At this time, the gas company informed the 
Honrud's that the furnace was releasing toxic gas and had a 
"flame disturbance". Because of this, Mountain Fuel will not 
turn on the gas until the furnace is replaced. We have enclosed 
a copy of Mountain Fuel's Notice of discontinuance of service. 
Under Section C of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, you, 
as the sellers, warranted that the heating system is sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. The contract also 
provides for attorney's fees and costs upon default. We are 
suggesting that you voluntarily agree to replace the furnace and 
pay the costs incurred by the Honrud's thus far to avoid 
additional substantial expense. 
Please find enclosed one estimate of replacement cost from 
the United Furnace and Air Conditioning Company. The Honruds are 
willing either to allow you to arrange for the furnace 
replacement or to make the arrangements themselves. Of course, 
if you choose to make the arrangements yourself, the Honruds will 
need assurances that a reputable company is installing a good 
furnace. 
077 /O 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
May 17, 1991 
Page 2 
Due to the serious nature of this problem, we expect an 
immediate reply within seven (7) days. Please feel free to 
contact us with any questions or concerns. 
Sincerely, 





P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, 
29 October 1991 
UT 84121 
P. LaTulippe, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eaqle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Honrud v Kersey 
C91- 4831 
Dear Ms. LaTulippe: 
Thank-you for 
correspondence. 
There is no fru 
the resolution 
furnace accordi 
counsel to the 
from the inspe 
attorney fees 
about one hour 
previous writte 
their prior as 
writina. 
your correction concerninq the date of my last 
stration concerninq the Kerseys' reasonable approach to 
of this case, the payment of half the cost of a new 
ng to the bid price first presented by Plaintiffs' 
includinq the money your clients took back 
is frustratinq is a jump in Plaintiffs* 
for services requirinq an expenditure of 
own mischaracterization in writinq of the 
provided. The Kerseys did not depart from 





n bid you 
sertions, 
Plaintiffs, from the onset, pushed the Kerseys, throuah counsel, for a 
new furnace, not a reasonable settlement and you're riqht, that hasn't 
chanqed. It was the Plaintiffs who denied the Kerseys an attempt to 
repair the furnace. 
It was the Plaintiffs who refused to contact the Kerseys to promptly 
and reasonably discuss the furnace with the Kersey's and resolve the 
matter between the parties from the onset, and who instead chose to 
wait thirty days and sustain the expense of counsel to negotiate that 
which could have been resolved without the intervention of counsel, 
the needless institution of a lawsuit and the increase in Plaintiffs' 
expenses. The Plaintiff's leqal fees have put the settlement of this 
case out of reach. 
Do what you will. Herewith find our Defendant's last offer of judgment 
consistent with my word. 
Yours/truly, 
Franklin Richsfrd Brussow 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT 
- J O / 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
V PROOF OF SERVICE 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, Case No. C 91 - 4831 
Defendants. JUDGE STIRBA 
FRANKLTN RICHARD BPU^SOW, # 5429 
Attorney lor Defendants 
P.O. Box 2170 5 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS SAY THAT, without admission of responsibilty or contractual 
or other liability. Defendants hereby offer to pay to Plaintiffs the 
sum of four hundred and twenty-five dollars ($425.00), which, when 
coupled with the $125.00 the Plaintiffs have taken back from their 
inspector, is half the price of a new furnace installed pursuant to 
the replacement bid provided by Plaintiff to Defendants. 
30 October 1991 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW 
Attorney for Defendants 
080 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
I ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, beina duly sworn, deposes and says that 
on 30 October 1991 the undersigned served a copy of Defendants' Offer 
of Judgment on Plaintiffs' attorneys at their business addresses by 
depositina same in the U.S. Mail, First Class postage pre-paid 
X7 e-paid. 
^FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW 
CHf**ft3?*'to J 
Subscribed and sworn to 
before me, a Notary Public, 
onn30 October 1991 
,Notary Public 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: ///// /rf^ 
081 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake Cityr UT 84121 
24 September 1991 
P. LaTulippe, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Honrud v Kersey 
C91- 4831 
Dear Ms. LaTulippe: 
Having reviewed your correspondence to me dated 17 October 1991, I am 
greatedly concerned about the direction in which this matter is 
heading. As Plaintiff's demand that the Kersey's pay attorney fees 
mounts, the parties are further apart. 
While you indicate that you had informed me by telephone that 
Plaintiffs1 attorney fees were "approximately $800.00", that you had a 
conversation with your clients, reviewed my submissions and sent me 
correspondence, the amount of your attorney fees has grown $600.00 for 
those services to approximately $1,400.00. The Kersey's refuse to pay 
attorney fees for a matter that could have been negotiated by the 
parties had the Honruds promptly contacted the Kerseys to negotiate a 
settlement rather than juxtaposing the expense of attorney fees after 
waiting more than thirty days to object to the putative defect. 
Your 17 October 1991 correspondence indicates that the Honruds had a 
furnace installed for $1,330.00, strangely you included the bid of 
United Furnace to install a furnace complete for $1,090.00 with your 
pervious correspondence of 17 May 1991. You will note I relied on your 
representation in Defendants Answer, paragraph 9. 
Your correspondence of 17 October 1991, apparently to close the gap 
between the $1,090.00 bid and the $1,330.00 Plaintiffs alleged they 
paid for some furnace, states "As we previously discussed, a new 
furnace had been estimated to cost $1,200.00 ..." That statement is 
untrue and is contradicted by your previous correspondence and exhibit 
you referenced therein which underscore the inaccuracy of that 
assertion. I have spoken to you in the past about what my clients 
perceived as inaccuracies in statements made to them and they were 
explained and accepted as mis-communications from the Honruds. 
At this juncture I am confused about obvious disparities in what you 
assert was said in negotiations and what your own writings contradict. 
I must disavow your characterizations of the our most recent 
conversation concerning this case as expressed in your correspondence 
of 17 October 1991. 
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The increase in the presently stated cost of replacement price over 
the previous bid of United Furnace consumes the $300,00 "contribution" 
the Plaintiff's claim to be making to settle this matter. Plaintiff's 
offer merely places the Kersey's further back from where they began 
and facing Plaintiff's inflating attorney fees, as well as the cost of 
protecting themselves. 
U.WULM.I the Fiam* , , .-> rejected the Kersey's offer to weld •_*> split 
at the front seam <. ! m - furnace, the Kerseys offer $425.00, half the 
price of the furnace as bid when coupled with the check Plaintiff's 
took back from their inspector, or $125.00. The total would be 
$550.00. You did indicate the TIC check remains uncashed " think ? 
I am reiterating that perhaps the realtors could be induced to 
contribute to the settlement, howeverr at the rate the Honrud's demand 
for attorney fees increases, this might be fruitless in satisfying 
part of the cost because of the attorney fees Plaintiff's continue to 
demand. Please advise me concerning Plaintiffs' position, since the 
Kersey's reject any o f f er t ha t i nc1ude s a c o ntr i but ion t o wa i d 
Plaintiff^' attoi: i i e y f e e s . 
Yours truly, 
rt r* • ersey 
Franklin Richard Brussow 
Attorney for Defendants 
P. LaTulippe, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 34111 
RE: Honrud v Kersey 
C91- 4831 
Dear Ms. LaTulippe: 
On or about 1 October 1991. I dispatched a second offer concerning 
settlement of the matter referenced above. 1 understand you made 
contact with my office indicating that your clients had begun 
installation of a new heater. You have not expressed your clients' 
acceptance or rejection of the last offer made by the Kerseys. 
Kindly indicate Plaintiffs' position on the last offer in writing so 
there will be no confusion between the parties as to whether a 
negotiated settlement of this matter might still be possible. The 
Kerseys'pending offer is still open. 
At this juncture I can indicate to you en behalf of the Kerseys that 
they cannot accept the Plaintiffs' nebulous offer of 24 September 
1991, as there is no sum certain stated in the offer and a party may 
not be expected to accept an open-ended settlement for an 
indeterminate amount. The Defendants continue to feel that Plaintiffs 
incurred attorney fees as a result of their own unwillingness to 
promptly contact the Kerseys to resolve this matter without the 
needless threat of the institution of litigation and intervention of 
attorneys. 
To date the Plaintiffs have almost half the cost of a new warranteed 
furnace, which would have a projected life of thirty to thirty-five 
years, in the form of the inspection fee that they took back from 
their inspector and the monetary offer of the Kerseys. 
Please advise me concerning Plaintiffs' position on the last offer, or 
provide the Defendants the Plaintiff's counter-offer for a sum 
certain as my clients have no way to ascertain their financial 
exposure, if they choose to accept Plaintiffs' last offer. 
Yours truly, 
Franklin Richard Brussow 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, UT 34121 
24 September 1991 
cc: D. & B. Kersey 3 
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STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT,nLAKE 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
DEMAND FOR HEARING 
OBJECTION TO REPLY 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
" ; - „ , j r 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS' DEMAND FOR HEARING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO URCP 56 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' REPLY 
n a i 
DEFENDANTS HEREBY DEMAND A HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' DISPOSITIVE MOTION 
HAVING PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' REPLY 
DEFENDANTS SAY: 
1. The Plaintiffs' discussion of the law is premature where 
Defendants' Affidavit rebuts crucial facts which, when submitted in 
evidence, would tend to cause a jury to conclude that it is more 
likely than not that: 
a. Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proving that the 
purported defect in the furnace occurred before the closing, since 
their own inspector's report tends to prove the opposite and 
Plaintiffs lack admissable evidence that the defect did not occur 
after the closing, notwithstanding the indefinite hearsay about an 
unnamed Mountain Fuel employee days after the the Plaintiffs had 
exclusive control over the furnace (A jury question); 
b. Plaintiffs waited thirty days to hire an attorney to dun 
Defendants for the total cost of a new furnace, because Plaintiffs' 
damaged the furnace, their own inspector previously having assured 
Plaintiffs of the fitness of the furnace shortly before the sale was 
closed; 
c. Plaintiffs refused to contact Defendants, to permit an 
attempt to repair the purported split, and to negotiate a fair 
resolution of their differences, but instead waited thirty-five days 
and hired an attorney so as to obtain a new furnace to which 
Plaintiffs had no contractural right; 
d. there was no mutual assent or meeting of the minds as to a 
warranty in the form contract of adhesion drafted by Plaintiff where 
Defendant expressed in the "contract" words tending to establish his 
intent to withhold a warranty in lieu of requiring Plaintiffs instead 
to rely on their inspector, and the lack of assent is always a 
question of fact for a jury. 
Plaintiffs claim Defendants' "conclusions of law" are 
"inappropriately" submitted to this Court, however, in paragraph five 
of their reply they contradictorily complain Defendants "fail to 
address legal arguments." 
2. Plaintiff cannot avoid by motion the obligation to sustain 
the burden of proving that the alleged defect existed before the 
closing and Plaintiffs' affidavit merely swears inadmissable hearsay 
upon hearsay as to what Plaintiff affiant heard some unnamed declarant 
say five days after the closing. Plaintiffs' inspector's report is 
probative that the purported defect arose after closing, and that 
Plaintiffs may have caused the damage as a pretext to coerce 
Defendants into providing a new furnace, in a fashion simlar to 
Plaintiffs' groundless complaints about the refrigerator. A jury may 
resolve these inferences from the evidence against Plaintiffs. 
A O ,i 
3. Plaintiffs' assertion that the hearsay upon hearsay in 
Plaintiffs' affidavit is admissable as a "present sense impression" 
demonstrates a woeful misunderstanding of URE 803 (1)• The affiant is 
not the unnamed declarant of the statements Plaintiff affiant 
asserts were uttered days after the event which was the subject of 
impressions, the splitting of the furnace chamber. This form of 
hearsay is the most unreliable type that litigants attempt to proffer 
when competent evidence is non-existent and it is most suspect when 
asserted by a self-interested Plaintiff, especially since admission 
would deny the Defendant the Constitutional right to confront the 
declarant witness and test him under cross-examination as to the 
"present sense impression" as said and as to what was actually meant 
by declarant . PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS ARE INADMISSABLE UNLESS A 
DECLARANT STATES THE HEARSAY CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE OBSERVATION 
OF THE EVENT THAT PROMPTS THE STATEMENT WHILE HE IS PERCEIVING THE 
OCCURENCE OF THE EVENT TO WHICH IT RELATES. It is obvious that the 
unnamed declarant DID NOT observe the purported occurence, the 
splitting of the furnace chamber. What self-interested Plaintiff 
thinks he overheard or perceived the declarant to say AN INDETERMINATE 
number of days after the subject event may have occured is 
inadmisable and unreliable since the impression is not affiant's 
"present sense impression" or anyone else's, but is the putative, 
formulated opinion of an unqualified, nameless non-party lacking the 
foundation to establish him as an expert prior to proffering his 
hearsay. Utah RE 802; URCP 56 (e) and 43 (a) & (b) . 
4. Plaintiff's affidavit is replete and reliant upon the 
purported personal knowledge of other declarants, not affiant's. 
Plaintiff affiant is no furnace expert. In fact, Plaintiffs attack 
Defendants in paragraph three of Plaintiff's "Objection to Defendants' 
Affidavit" for offering similar out-of-court admissions of Plaintiffs' 
agent inspector, even though Plaintiff, not Defendant, bears the 
burden of proof. 
5. Plaintiffs lack admissable evidence to conclusively prove 
when the purported furnace split and Plaintiffs' inspector's report 
about the sound condition of the furnace precludes summary 
disposition. Plaintiffs proffer only inadmissable and inconclusive 
circumstantial hearsay of a nameless declarant allegedly said after 
the Plaintiffs had sole possession and purportedly recalled in 
Plaintiffs', not declarant's, affidavit. Another material question of 
fact precluding summary disposition is that Plaintiffs may have 
damaged the furnace and refused to permit a repair to wrongfully 
obtain a new furnace. Admittedly, Plaintiff did not file a wastefully 
expensive and unnecessary formal brief of the law, it being obvious in 
this $1,300.00 furnace case that Plaintiffs lack the factual proof to 
make their case on motion or before a jury. Plaintiffs continue to 
demand that to which they are not entitled, the total cost of a new 
furnace, challenging Defendants to sustain the unnecessary spiraling 
expenses Plaintiffs' brief perpetuates, notwithstanding that it is 
abundantly clear that unresolved, pivotal factual questions preclude 
summary judgment. 
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6. Plaintiffs1 erroneously fault Defendants for Plaintiff's 
costly rush to an attorney before contacting Defendants about the 
furnace and then to the courthouse to intimidate the unrepresented 
Defendants upon their notification to Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs' 
inspector reported that he had not found a defect in the furnace 
before the closing. Plaintiffs refused to respond to this notification 
during negotiations and sued. It was Plaintiffs' who wastefully filed 
this $2,200.00 Motion for Summary judgment fully realizing they have 
no real proof for the jury of when the defect occurred, nor that 
Plaintiffs did not damage the furnace themselves. Plaintiffs' 
affidavit merely underscores their intractable demand for the entire 
cost of a new furnace and Plaintiffs' needless and exorbitant attorney 
fees. Plaintiffs' "readily offer" evidence of attorney fees to the 
Court when challenged, but still actually withhold it as they avoid 
submitting the "best evidence" of the price paid for the new furnace, 
a paid invoice. No attorney would expect a client to pay upon a 
statement as vague as Plaintiffs submitted. 
Plaintiffs refused to negotiate a reasonable resolution like the 
provision of the value of a serviceable furnace of the same type and 
age as the existing furnace, with Plaintiffs contributing the 
additional amount toward the cost of the new furnace. However, 
Plaintiff's still unconscionably demand as a windfall not only the 
whole cost be sustained by Defendants who never intended a warranty, 
but also Plaintiffs' attorneys fees be paid for the attempt to foist 
on Defendants the onerous demand that is well beyond the fair amount 
of damages that would be recoverable if there had been mutual assent 
to a warranty. 
DATE: 10 January 1992 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
FRANKLIN RICHARD /BRUSSOW, #5429 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD a n d STEPHANIE 
HONRUD, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v . 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
states: 
1. I am an attorney in good standing licensed to practice 
law in the State of Utah, and have acted as counsel for the 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter. 
2. Nielsen & Senior has spent approximately 47.1 hours 
bring this claim to judgment; Neil R. Sabin has billed 1.6 hours 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
14888 
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at $130 an hour, I have billed 45.5 hours at $75 an hour, for a 
total of $3,620.50. This includes investigation, extensive 
settlement efforts, and the drafting of various pleadings. The 
time involved, as per agreement with the client, is reasonable 
and comparable with others providing similar services. 
3. The costs incurred for this matter are $135.09. 
DATED this //^day of December, 1991. 
PATRICIALTLATDISPPE 
On the /H^i day of December, 1991, personally appeared 
before me PATRICIA L. LATULIPPE, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
fanef** 'S^^tx^se^s^Tje^Ssf'-^ef^il 
I /fT-'^ LAl-JXC- KAY S=fKl\S 1 
STATOFbTAH 
5>* 3eD*cnDor :o. 1994 
"** EG" •
 twoc* ! > . f V - c-u L/7 bt<?47 
NOTARY PUBLIC Q 




Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE 
HONRUD, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v . 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs, pursuant to court order, submit the following 
detailed breakdown of attorney fees and costs incurred in the 
above-named case: 




1.00 Initial meeting with the 
Honruds to discuss matter; 
Drafting demand letters 
to seller and inspection 
company. 
0.30 Finalization of demand 
letters; verification 
with client of accuracy. 
0.10 Follow-up with Stephanie 


















0.40 Cover letter explaining 30.00 
retainer. Call with 
Stephanie. 
0.20 Telephone conferences 15.00 
with Curtis McDouglass, 
the Kerseys and clients 
(concerning the issues 
of the case). 
0.10 Telephone conference 7.50 
with Stephanie as to 
Kersey's response. 
1.90 Conference with Faust; 142.50 
investigation of reply 
letter; drafting answer 
to reply; finalize 
second draft with 
letter to Honruds; 
0.40 Call with Stephanie to 30.00 
discuss response and 
follow-up. 
0.50 Letter to Kersey's to 37.50 
supplement requested 
information. Conference 
with Mark Anderson on 
contractual matters. 
0.40 Discussion with Faust 30.00 
regarding steps to 
follow; telephone 
conference with Honruds. 
0.40 Investigating Trust Deed 30.00 
to determine if transaction 
resulted in merger of title 
which would affect this 
case. Follow-up call to 
Dave Honrud. 
0.40 Follow-up and further 30.00 
investigation of 
warranties. 
0.50 Drafting letter to Kerseys 37.50 
responding to their questions 
and reaffirming our position. 
0.30 Calls with Stephanie on 22.50 
lack of response and next 
step. 
0.10 Call with Stephanie 7.50 
discussing filing a 
complaint and retainer. 
0.70 Call with Mr. Dave Honrud 52.50 
on case status. Drafting 
reply to Kerseys. 
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0.30 Follow-up call with 22 
Stephanie upon receipt of 
Kersey's letter; 
conference with Neil 
Sabin. 
1.50 Call with Stephanie to 112 
discuss case procedures, 
time frame, judgment; 
drafting complaint. 
0.70 Second draft complaint 52 
adding breach of contract 
claim. 
0.20 Review proposed complaint 26 
for form and 
completeness. 
0.20 Review of amended 26 
complaint. 
0.30 Finalizing Complaint. 22 
0.10 Follow-up on service of 7 
complaint. 
0.30 Follow-up on service of 22 
complaint. 
0.40 Settlement discussion with 30 
opposing counsel on resolving 
dispute. 
0.80 Call with Ms. Honrud to 60 
discuss settlement and 
inspection. Review answer 
from Kerseys. 
0.30 Call with Mr. Brussow to 22 
set up inspection meeting; 
call to Honruds to get 
approval as to time for 
inspection. 
0.60 Follow-up on arranging 45 
inspection; calls to Mr. 
Brussow and the Honruds. 
0.20 Reminder letter for 15 
inspection meeting. 
0.10 Further follow-up on 7 
scheduling. 
1.50 Meeting with clients, 112 
opposing counsel, 
Mountain Fuel, TCI, and 
furnace repairman; 
Conference with Mountain 
Fuel and clients afterwards. 
0.50 Telephone conference with 37 

















0.50 Telephone conference with 
Honruds on settlement 
proposal; call back from 
Mrs. Honrud; conference 
with Neil Sabin. 
0.30 Telephone conference 
discussing settlement with 
Mr. Brussow; telephone 
conference with Honruds 
discussing settlement. 
0.40 Follow-up call with 
Stephanie on settlement 
status. 
0.60 Telephone conference with 
Mr. Brussow; review of 
Kersey offer; call to Mr. 
Honrud to discuss offer; 
reply letter to Kerseys. 
0.20 Telephone conference with 
Stephanie on status of 
settlement. 
0.20 Phone call with Stephanie 
to get BTU information on 
furnace. 
0.60 Review of settlement offer 
and letter to Honruds. 
Telephone conference with 
Stephanie. 
0.10 Telephone conference re: 
furnace and go ahead to 
install. 
2.00 Drafting motion and 
memorandum to support 
summary judgment. 
0.20 Reading through letter 
from Mr. Brussow; 
response to his office. 
0.30 Telephone conference with 
Stephanie Honrud on status 
of case. 
2.60 Telephone conference with 
Mr. Honrud; letter to Mr. 
Brussow rejecting offer; 
further drafting of 
memorandum for summary 
judgment. 
0.30 Follow-up with Mountain 
Fuel; review Mr, 






1 5 . 0 0 
1 5 . 0 0 
4 5 . 0 0 
7 . 5 0 
150 .00 
1 5 . 0 0 






















0.20 Reply letter to Brussow. 26.00 
0.50 Further follow-up with 37.50 
Mountain Fuel; discussing 
possibility of an affidavit; 
conference with Neil Sabin. 
0.30 Letter to Honruds 22.50 
concerning payment. 
0.40 Telephone conference with 30.00 
Mr. Croft, legal counsel 
for Mountain Fuel, to 
discuss affidavit. 
1.00 Drafting Dave and 75.00 
Stephanie Honrud's 
affidavit; further 
drafting of memorandum 
for summary judgment. 
0.40 Review Kersey offer and 30.00 
letter to client. 
0.20 Telephone conference 15.00 
with Stephanie Honrud on 
settlement. 
1.00 Further drafting of 75.00 
Honrud affidavit. 
1.20 Telephone conference with 90.00 
Stephanie; drafting 
motion and memorandum for 
Summary Judgment. 
1.50 Research on abrogation 112.50 
clauses. 
2.00 Further research in 150.00 
preparation for summary 
judgment. 
1.50 Further research and 112.50 
investigation. 
.60 Further drafting of memo. 45.00 
2.00 Further drafting of 150.00 
memorandum. 
1.50 Research on contract 112.50 
language and further 
drafting of memo. 
0.50 Review Memorandum and 65.00 
Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
1.70 Second draft of memo. 127.50 
Drafting affidavit of 
Patricia LaTulippe. 
3.00 Third draft. Finalize 225.00 


























Review of documents; 
conference with Neil R. 
Sabin; further review and 
preparation for response. 
Drafting objection to 
Defendant's affidavit; 
reply to Defendant's 
response and a request 
for ruling. 
Review Reply Memo for 
Summary Judgment and 
drafting objection to 
Affidavit. 
Second draft and 
finalization of reply 
pleadings. 
Follow-up with Stephanie 
on status of Summary 
Judgment. 
Follow-up on hearing. 
Review pleadings in 
preparation for hearing 
on Summary Judgment. 
Preparation for oral 
argument on Plaintiffs' 
Summary Judgment Motion; 
appearance at Summary 
Judgment Hearing. 
Drafting order for 
summary judgment. 
Revisions to judge's order. 
Review Summary Judgment 












Total fees for Services This Period 4,151.00 
5/28/91 Copy Charges 
5/28/91 Copy Charges 
6/21/91 Copy Charges 
7/08/91 Copy Charges 
7/10/91 Postal Charges 
7/30/91 Filing fee for complaint 
7/30/91 Messenger Delivery 










8/20/91 Constable's fee for service of summons and 
complaint upon defendants Kersey 
8/20/91 Copy Charges 
8/20/91 Messenger Delivery 
8/24/91 Copy Charges 
10/23/91 Copy Charges 
10/25/91 Copy Charges 
10/25/91 Postal Charges 
11/08/91 Copy Charges 
12/05/91 Westlaw Charges 
12/11/91 Postal Charges 
12/11/91 Westlaw Charges 
12/11/91 Copy Charges 
12/11/91 Copy Charges 
12/11/91 Messenger Delivery 
12/30/91 Postal Charges 
12/31/91 Copy Charges 
1/02/92 Copy Charges 
1/02/92 Postal Charges 
3/02/92 Copy Charges 
3/05/92 Postal Charges 
3/12/92 Messenger Delivery 
3/12/92 Copy Charges 


































Total Fees and Costs 4,364.43 
DATED this \6&- day of April, 1992. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
15920.7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the {(J— day of April, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Statement of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs to be placed in the United States mail, 
first class, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
^ddk^A.^UuijAv^ 
1 < -l 
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STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COl^TYoOFoS^^ L^KE 




RESPONSE TO MOTION 
OBJECTION 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS* RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
FEES AND COSTS 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
DEFENDANTS HEREBY DEMAND A HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION 
PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
HAVING 
DEFENDANTS SAY: 
1. The contract between the parties, clause Nf provides a 
reasonable attorney's fee, costs and expenses may only be granted when 
such amounts arise or accrue from enforcing or pursuing a remedy. 
2. The charges in Plaintiffs' Statement 
unwarranted throughout, more specifically: 
are unreasonable and 
the entries from 3/11/92 - 3/11/92 unreasonably 
demand one hour and twenty four minutes or $116.50 for 
a simple two page order that could have been 
dictated, typed and edited in less than .50 hours; 
the entry of 3/02/92 unreasonably demands three hours or 
$ 225.00 to attend and argue a half-hour motion that 
Plaintiffs' counsel previously researched and prepared 
the entries of 10/23/92, 10/24/92, 10/28/92 wherein 
Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an 
affidavit from a Mt. Fuel employee that was refused due 
to the incompetence of that proposed affiant to swear 
to the defect Plaintiffs allege occurred after the 
closing are unreasonable. 
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3. If the Mt. Fuel employee's testimony could have factually 
established that a defect occurred before the closing to support the 
Plaintiffs* motion by arguably effectuating the warranty, they could 
have subpoenaed and deposed that witness over his refusal of an 
affidavit. However, the facts being other than they wished, Plaintiffs 
offered their own inadmissable and prohibited hearsay affidavit that 
ascribed statements to a Mt. Fuel employee who refused to so swear. 
The "warrantyf" clause C, terminated by its own terms at closing. Fees 
for services on 10/23/92, 10/24/92, 10/28/92 are unreasonable and 
non-assessable. URCP 56(e), 43(a), 43(b), and RE 802. 
4. It is unreasonable to penalize Defendants for fees associated 
with services related to Plaintiffs' inability to secure a reliable 
and admissable affidavit containing an expert opinion to prove their 
case, especially when such refusal by Mt. Fuel cogently demonstrated 
to Plaintiffs that proof as to when the purported defect occurred was 
non-existent. 
5. Nor should Defendants be penalized for the cost of 
Plaintiff's own affidavit on 10/30/91, 11/7/91, 12/10/91, that 
inadmissably attempted to attribute to the Mt. Fuel employee 
unreliable, self-serving hearsay of what Plaintiffs said they heard 
the declarant say in their attempt to overcome the truth. It is 
unreasonable to charge services associated with the creation and 
submission of the unlawful affidavit against Defendants. 
6. Attorney's fees, costs and expenses were unreasonably 
generated in this de minimus case since Plaintiff s unreasonably 
incurred attorneys fees before giving notice to Defendants of the 
purported breach, refused to permit Defendants to cure before 
escalating expenses by involving attorneys, hastily instituted suit 
while negoitiations were ongoing, refused offers of judgment made in 
an amount commensurate with the benefit of the bargain allegedly lost, 
and demanded an unreasonable remedy contrary to hornbook contract law: 
to wit, damages in the amount of a new furnace well in excess of the 
bargain allegedly lost - the value of a used furnace in the used 
dwelling that Plaintiffs purchased. 
7. Defendants never warranted that the purchase of the older 
dwelling included a new furnace in the bargain and it was unreasonable 
for Plaintiffs to demand as remedy that for which they never 
bargained, a new furnace, while needlessly increasing attorney fees to 
obtain a windfall to which Plaintiffs were not entitled. 
8. Although Defendants appeared gratuitously at the house after 
the closing to assist Plaintiffs in learning how to operate the 
various features of the dwelling and Defendants had received notice 
of, and solved, other of Plaintiffs' complaints, the Plaintiffs 
unreasonably incurred attorney fee's before notifying Plaintiffs 
thirty-five days after the closing about the furnace defect that 
purportedly occurred before the closing. Such fees are unreasonable. 
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9. Defendants demonstrated reasonable conduct throughout to 
negotiate the resolution of this matter after being informed of the 
defect alleged, but Plaintiffs unreasonably chose to incur attorney 
fees before reasonably giving Defendants notice. Plaintiffs then 
demanded the unnecessary attorney's fees they caused themselves 
through unreasonable haste, immediately obviating fair settlement. 
10. Then Plaintiffs unreasonably chose to increase their expenses 
by onerously filing suit on 29 July 1991 against the unrepresented 
Plaintiffs in response to Defendants1 report to Plaintiffs1 counsel 
that the furnace inspector hired by Plaintiffs agreed that the furnace 
was in good operating condition shortly before the closing. Plaintiffs 
unreasonably terminated the negotiations and sued to punish Defendants 
for reasonably seeking an explanation as to why Plaintiffs1 untimely 
notice of defect was contradicted by Plaintiffs1 own expert. 
11. Plaintiffs refused to accept as a reasonable resolution, the 
provision of the value of a serviceable furnace of the same type and 
age as the existing furnace, with Plaintiffs contributing the 
additional amount toward the cost of the new furnace. 
TO CORROBORATE THE CONTENT OF THE PARAGRAGHS ABOVE, DEFENDANTS 
INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE IS IF FULLY SET FORTH HEREIN DEFENDANTS' 
AFFIDAVIT AND THE EXHIBITS APPENDED THERETO AS PREVIOUSLY FILED IN 
THIS COURT. 
DATE: 8 May 1992 
FRANKLIN RICHARD/feRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the above document was served on 
Plaintiffs' Counsel at her business address noticed in this case by 
First Class U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid/?on 8 May 1992. 
DATE: 8 May 1992 ^^ f^^ V^^ ^ 
FRANKLIN RICHARJ^BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
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STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
By. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. C 91 - 4831 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
•>fdJuccj;Detr.ct 
W ^ a. 1992 
— SA'UA»» COUNTY 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
DEFENDANTS SAY: 
1. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for attorney fees on 30 April 
1992 and Defendants filed their Objection to this Motion on 8 May 
1992. 
2. Defendants objected to specific fees associated with 
particular services as is permitted by law. Objection, Paragraph 2. 
3. Defendants also objected to the unreasonable amount of the 
fees generated by Plaintiffs' Counsel since the contract the Court 
determined to be enforceable grants fees only for those services 
reasonably necessary to enforce the conditions of the contract. Clause 
N. Documents in the Court file and submitted exhibits established 
that Defendants always reasonably sought to resolve Plaintiffs' 
dispute without the unnecessary intervention of the Court. 
4. Defendants should not be punished or sanctioned pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for merely asserting their right to have the Court 
determine whether attorney fees four times greater than the benefit of 
the bargain allegedly demanded BY Plaintiffs are unreasonable and did 
not have to be unncessarily generated if Plaintiffs had merely 
contacted Defendants and attempted to resolve the matter between the 
parties rather than incurring the needless expense of hiring counsel 
and bringing a suit that put settlement out of reach. 
5. Should the Court be of a mind to penalize Defendants for 
requesting their objections be heard, Defendants would waive the right 
to a hearing and would acquiesce in the Court deciding the issue of 
fees on the written record to avoid further exposure to sanctions. 
WHEREFORE, 
Sanctions. 
Defendants request the Court deny Plaintiffs* Motion for 
1°J 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Plaintiffs' assert Defendants are in bad faith and should be 
sanctioned because they request that Court determine what attorney 
fees, if any, are "reasonable" in this case. In determining what is 
a "reasonable" attorney's fee, a valid and unresolved factual and 
legal determination, the Court may be guided by analogy to those 
provisions of 42 USC 1983 and 1988 concerning "reasonable attorney 
fees" that have long been interpreted by the Federal Courts from which 
Utah derives a substantial portion of the URCP and URE. 
Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, 488 F2d 714 (CAS 1974) is the 
seminal holding often cited as establishing those factors to be 
considered in determining a reasonable attorney's fee. The eighth 
factor in Johnson is most significant in this case - 8. the amount 
involved and the results obtained. 
Plaintiffs erroneously claim Defendants are in bad faith, since they 
object to a $4,000.00 fee in a case that allegedly involved only 
$1,100.00 for a new furnace. This is unreasonable and objection is 
clearly warranted under existing principles of law, Johnson, which 
establishes Defendant's good faith, if not absolute, right to object 
to the excessive fee to produce a modest recovery. 
Johnson relevantly teaches that the result obtained in Plaintiffs' 
attempt to secure an affidavit from Mt. Fuel should not be assessed 
against Defendants since the services obtained no result. Defendants 
are in good faith when protesting those fees, since such efforts of 
Plaintiff's counsel did nothing to further the achievement of a 
successful result. Johnson warrants this objection is well grounded in 
the facts sworn to in the record as filed. Attempting to punish 
Defendants under Rule 11 for their reliance on the principles of law 
established in Johnson, and a myriad of cases that analogize to that 
holding, is frivolous and unsupported by Rule 11. 
In this case the court is offered only the applicant's self-serving 
affidavit that counsel thinks her fees are reasonable. Normally an 
applicant must obtain the affidavit of another dis-interested attorney 
in the area and submit same to the court or cite to previous awards by 
other courts. In ten years of practice before the Federal bench during 
which Defendants' counsel filed for and was awarded attorney fees for 
prevailing, never did a court rule that an objection and demand for a 
hearing on a fee statement was unwarranted by law. It is counsel's 
burden to establish the services billed were "reasonable." Due process 
requires it and objecting to Plaintiffs' motion is not bad faith or 
harassment - it is Defendants' right. It is not harassment to object 
to that which the law provides is improper or unjust, especially when 
established legal principles provide logical and legal basis for such 
objections. 
Addressing the other Johnson factors which demonstrate that 
Defendants' objections are in good faith, are valid and are not in any 
manner harassment or violative of Rule 11 and 78-27-56: 
1. time and labor required - Defendants' objection establishes 
that some services of Plaintiffs' counsel were not only unnecessary to 
prevail, but also needlessly contributed nothing but expense; 
] ?3 
2. the novelty and difficulty of the questions - This case was 
not a complex litigation; 
3. the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly -
Only average skills would be required in a case of this type; 
4. preclusion of other employment - Counsel would be precluded 
from addressing other cases while working on this case; 
5. customary fee - Plainbtiffs' Counsel's affidavit is devoid as 
to her customary fee; 
6. whether the fee is fixed or contingent - No indication of the 
terms of the contract between Counsel and Plaintiffs are revealed, nor 
is the contract for services rendered submitted to the Court for 
review, in camera or otherwise; 
7. time limitations - Time was not a factor enhancing the rate 
charged. 
Johnson is especially relevant since Defendants offered half the 
price of a new furnace to replace the used furnace for which 
Plaintiffs bargained, and Plaintiffs' attorney fees were 
self-inflicted by their premature rush to incur the expense of an 
attorney rather than first giving notice of the alleged defect to 
obtain repair or replacement, and also by impatiently filing suit 
against the unrepresented Defendants while negotiations were ongoing. 
The contract, Clause N, provides for "reasonable," not actual, 
attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs' delaying thirty days without giving any notice to 
Defendants and rushing off to an attorney, then to the courthouse 
while negotiations were ongoing bespeaks Plaintiff's unreasonableness 
from the onset. The Court may analogize to legal principles extending 
refusal to award attorney fees that are statutorily provided for under 
the Federal Freedom of Information Act to those contractually included 
in Clause N in this case. Where litigants like Plaintiffs refuse to 
first test the possibilities of a potentially far less expensive and 
no less effacacious method of dispute resolution, like notifying 
Defendants of Plaintiffs' demand before incurring and demanding 
needless attorney fees, and then exacerbate delay and contribute to a 
probably unnecessary lawsuit by filing suit, attorney's fees should be 
denied. Murty v OPM, 707 F2d 815, 816 (CA4 1983). 
Likewise, when parties to a dispute are making progress toward 
negotiating a settlement although confronted with the prospect of 
exposure to attorney fees, Courts have refused to grant attorney fees 
to a party who refuses to direct a minimal response like a phone call 
to the Defendant to ascertain the accuracy of Plaintiff's perception 
that Defendant is no longer negotiating toward a resolution, 
preferring instead to unreasonably file suit because of a loss of 
patience. Vermont Low Income v Usery, 546 F2d 509, 513-514 (CA2 1976): 
But, as every lawyer should know, the fact that a party is 
legally entitled to invoke the aid of the courts does not 
demonstrate that a rush to the courthouse door is always 
reasonable. 
Pursuant to Rule 11, there are existing legal principles that 
logically warrant extension to the facts of the instant case wherein 
Defendants request that the court determine Plaintiff's demand for 
124 
attorney's fees is both excessive and unreasonable pursuant to the law 
and the relevant facts. The unreasonable and excessive attorney fees 
of Plaintiffs should be denied to avoid reinforcing litigatious 
parties who unreasonably rush to the courthouse to sue first, 
contentiously incurring and demanding attorney fees that put 
settlement out of reach, and then ask questions later. 
DATE: 28 May 1992 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BKUSSOW, # 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121 
801 - 944 - 1065 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the above document was served on 
Plaintiffs1 Counsel at her business address noticed in this case by 
First Class U. S. Mail, postage pre-paijjK, on 28 May 
DATE: 28 May 1992 
FRANKLIN RICHARD E^ ftUSSOW, # 5429 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE 
HONRUD, ) REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' 
) RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) 
) Civil No. 910904831CV 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, ) 
) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendants. ) 
The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, submit a brief 
reply to the Defendants' Response to Motion for Sanctions. 
Defendants fail to recognize Plaintiffs• point in filing the 
Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiffs are not questioning Defendants' 
rights to object or question the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' 
fees. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Defendants have a right to 
review and question fees incurred by Plaintiffs. The purpose 
behind Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions has nothing to do with 
the attorneys fees. Rather, the Request for Sanctions is based 
upon the fact that Defendants continue to reargue issues 
, - J * 
16636 
1?3 
previously decided by this Court. These issues are extraneous to 
the question of attorneys fees. Thus, Defendants1 actions, 
consistent with past problems encountered by Plaintiffs, continue 
to increase Plaintiffs' losses. For these reasons, Plaintiffs 
move the Court for sanctions. 
DATED this ^^i^-day of June, 1992. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Nell R. SafedTn 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS, was mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, on the ^>^-day of June, 1992, addressed 
as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P. 0. 21705 
Sal t Lake City , Utah 84121 
/Z^^^)^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 









Case No. 910904831 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah; at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, March 2, 
1992, at 2:00 p.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
PATRICIA L. LATULIPPE 
Attorney at Law 
60th East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSS0W 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 MONDAY. MARCH 2. 1992 2:00 P.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Let's go on the 
4 record in the matter of Honrud vs. Kersey, case No. 
5 910904831. The matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
6 the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel, 
7 would you state your appearances, please. 
8 VOICE: Patricia Latulippe appearing on behalf 
9 of the plaintiffs. 
10 VOICE: I am Franklin Brussow. I am here on 
11 behalf of the defendants. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. I 
13 have reviewed all of the proceedings pertaining to this 
14 Motion for Summary Judgment, including this affidavit and 
15 there actually were two pleadings by each party. There 
16 I was actually a response by the defendant to the reply of 
17 the plaintiff, and I feel very well informed as to the 
18 facts of the case and so you don't need to go into detail 
19 about those. You may proceed Ms. Latulippe. 
20 MS. LATULIPPE: Your Honor, this is a very 
21 simple case and we are sorry to be before you taking your 
I i » 
22 I time. As you have read the pleadings, it is an action 
23 for breach of warranty and for the cost and expenses that 
24 have resulted from that warranty. 
25 The parties entered into a contract, an Earnest 
1 Money Contract to purchase property. When they took 
2 possession of the property, the furnace was not in the 
3 condition that it was represented to be. Four days after 
4 closing, at the time they took possession, they had a 
5 Mountain Fuel representative come out. This was the 
6 first attempt to use the furnace. At this time the 
7 representative told them that the furnace was unsafe. In 
8 fact, life-threatening, that he would not light the 
9 furnace until it was replaced or repaired. At that point 
10 they contacted me. 
11 They are first-time buyers, a young couple, and 
12 they did not know how to proceed. They contacted me. We 
13 sent a letter to defendant advising them of the problem 
14 and asking that they contact us so that we might discuss 
15 a resolution. A series of letters were exchanged and I 
16 believe there are some of those that have been submitted 
17 to the Court. And we repeatedly told the defendants that 
18 we would be happy to offer to allow an inspection of the 
19 property with a 24-hour notice. With just a 24-hour 
20 notice, and an inspection was never scheduled. We 
21 advised the defendants that if an inspection was not 
22 scheduled, we would go ahead and file a complaint, and we 
23 did not hear, that inspection was not scheduled nor 
24 attempted to be and so we did file a complaint. 
25 Subsequent to that, there was an inspection 
1 that took place of the property in September of 1991, 
2 Those present at the inspection were a Mountain Fuel 
3 representative, the plaintiffs and I was there, defendant 
4 and counsel, his counsel, two independent representatives 
5 and the people who had originally inspected the furnace. 
6 And they all verified, all those in attendance verified 
7 that in fact there was a split in the furnace. 
8 Before you today there is evidence from the 
9 plaintiff, both in the form of the business record from 
10 Mountain Fuel that the condition of the furnace was 
11 inoperable, and an affidavit from the plaintiff attesting 
12 to that fact. There is no contrary evidence submitted by 
13 the defendant. Under the contract, the defendants had 
14 warranted that, in fact, the furnace would be in working 
15 order. 
16 THE COURT: You are referring to paragraph C of 
17 the Earnest Money Agreement? 
18 MS. LATULIPPE: I am. In paragraph C they 
19 warranted it would be in sound or satisfactory working 
20 condition. In Exhibit 8 is the Earnest Money Contract 
21 which I am now referring to. On the third page of that 
22 contract, under No. 6, again seller does not limit in any 
23 way the warranties under section C. And a little further 
24 down on that page, in bold print, there is a provision — 
25 well, No. 11 incorporates the general provisions and 
t 
1 expresses that both the buyer and the seller have 
2 I accepted those. And on the fourth page, under 0, the 
3 I express warranties of section C are preserved through the 
4 final closing documents. 
5 Thus it is in clear and unequivocal language, 
6 the defendants have warranted that the furnace would be 
7 in satisfactory condition. And the Brooks case, which I 
8 have cited in my memo, is instructive and almost directly 
9 on point. 
10 In Brooks the parties had entered into a 
11 contract that contained express warranties. There was an 
12 inspection by professionals before the closing of the 
13 contracts. After the closing when the buyers took 
14 possession of the property, they noticed a strong odor 
15 coming 'from the residence. They alleged that the sellers 
16 had breached an express warranty and, in fact, the Court 
17 found that they had breached an express warranty. And 
18 this decision was upheld on appeal. 
19 Our case is very similar. We have express 
20 warranties and the property was in a different condition 
21 as promised when the plaintiffs took possession of that 
22 property. There has been no contrary evidence submitted 
23 to refute that. 
24 Furthermore, the provisions that I have 
25 mentioned did not merge at closing. Utah Courts have 
1 held that in a contract when there is a manifest clear 
2 intent to preserve rights, that they would not merge. In 
3 provision 0 we have unambiguous language that preserves 
4 those warranties through the final closing. Defendant 
5 has muddied the issues by submitting numerous, irrelevant 
6 facts and frivolous objections and perhaps this gives the 
7 Court some idea of the problems we faced in trying to 
8 resolve this matter. Defendant raises an argument that 
9 there is a constitutional right to confront witnesses. I 
10 believe counsel is referring to the Sixth Amendment. 
11 However, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 
12 does not apply in civil cases, only applies to criminal 
13 matters. 
14 Defendant argues that the contract was an 
15 adhesion contract. The contracts used were the standard 
16 forms that was widely accepted throughout the state and 
17 used by all realtors. Either agent, whether the buyers' 
18 agent drafted the contract or whether the sellers' agent 
19 drafted the contract, they both would have used the same 
20 forms. So it is hardly an adhesion contract. 
21 Defendant objects to plaintiffs' affidavit that 
22 it does not identify the declarant. The Federal Rules of 
23 Evidence merely require that the person have personal 
24 knowledge, not that they be identified as is the case 
25 oftentimes with bystanders. Also, the business record 
1 exception applies. The report from Mountain Fuel 
2 establishes the broken condition of the furnace. 
3 Instead of responding to the factual issues and 
4 to the legal argument, defendant would like to discuss 
5 the efforts of settlement. However, these are not 
6 relevant nor admissible. 
7 In this case, it is crucial that the plaintiffs 
8 be awarded attorney's fees for their rising costs. 
9 Again, the pleadings are indicative of why such costs 
10 were incurred. Sellers warranted that the furnace would 
11 be in working condition. It was not and we have had to 
12 go the rounds to try and get a new furnace. 
13 The contract provides for attorney's fees in 
14 provision N and the Utah Courts have held that when fees 
15 are provided within a contract, they should be awarded. 
16 So in conclusion, the plaintiffs have met their 
17 burden of presenting a prima facie case. What evidence 
18 is there before the Court to contradict? The bottom line 
19 is, the language of the Court is clear. The sellers 
20 warranted the condition of the furnace. No evidence has 
21 been presented to dispute its condition. No response was 
22 made as to the law. We ask that our Motion for Summary 
23 Judgment be granted and that the plaintiff's be awarded 
24 their attorney's fees. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, 
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1 Ms. Latulippe. Mr. Brussow. 
2 MR. BRUSSOW: Thank you, Your Honor. If it 
3 please the Court, I am here to un-muddy your water and 
4 make things clear, okay, and I hope I can do that. First 
5 of all, as far as the constitutional right to a jury 
6 trial, that is a Fifth Amendment right. You don't take 
7 people's property away without giving them a hearing, and 
8 in this case we would ask for a jury to hear the facts. 
9 The question before the Court is: MAre there disputed 
10 facts that are reputing any affidavits that would cause 
11 this Court to have a .jury hear this case?" And there 
12 are. 
13 What counsel is avoiding here is, they had an 
14 inspector come and inspect this house pursuant to their 
15 rights in the contract shortly before the closing. That 
16 inspector assured them that that furnace was okay. Five 
17 days after the closing, after these people had possession 
18 of the house, they found that there was purportedly a 
19 crack in the furnace but they waited 30 days in the 
20 wintertime to contact the Kerseys, although they 
21 contacted the Kerseys about a refrigerator problem that 
22 got cured. 
23 THE COURT: What difference does it make how 
24 long they wanted? 
25 MR. BRUSSOW: Because the fact is that the 
1 crack in the furnace had to occur prior to the closing. 
2 And if, in fact, there was a difficulty, there were toxic 
3 fumes, as they say, as counsel says, and there has been 
4 some language thrown around here that muddies the waters, 
5 they all verified the split in the furnace. There is no 
6 verification from any person about the split in the 
7 furnace, other than the plaintiffs themselves. There is 
8 no verification that that split did not occur between the 
9 date of the closing and five days later when they took 
10 possession. There is no proof here and a Jury could 
11 decide that based upon the way these people conducted 
12 themselves, that they waited 30 days after they said the 
13 furnace was broken, that they didn't go into the house or 
14 did go in the house and didn't ask Mr. Kersey about the 
15 furnace/ If they called him up about the refrigerator, 
16 if they called him up about the other items, why did they 
17 wait 30 days in the winter to call him up about a 
18 furnace? There is a problem here. I don't understand 
19 why somebody who had discourse with someone wouldn't 
20 complain about a defect. 
21 THE COURT: Now, as to this verification, I 
22 assume you are making reference to this meeting that 
23 occurred at the house for the inspection in the fall. 
24 MR. BRUSSOW: That is correct. 
25 THE COURT: And at that time, according to the 
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1 plaintiff, everybody saw this crack? 
2 MR. BRUSSOW: That is correct, but that doesn't 
3 solve the problem because when the furnace was turned off 
4 on the date of closing, no one can testify that that 
5 crack didn't evidence itself between those five days. No 
6 one can say that these people themselves didn't damage 
7 that furnace. That is a question of fact. A jury has 
8 got a right to decide whether, based upon the inspection 
9 of their own inspector that said that furnace was okay 
10 before the closing, and five days after the closing 
11 somebody comes in and says, "There is a split in it," but 
12 nobody is saying how that split got there. What caused 
13 the split. 
14 THE COURT: Well, you can't speculate to that 
15 J in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
16 MR. BRUSSOW: Exactly. 
17 THE COURT: What facts do you have before the 
18 Court today in opposition to that? 
19 MR. BRUSSOW: I don't need to, the burden is on 
20 them and they have never established when that crack 
21 occurred. They established that five days after the 
22 closing there was a crack there, but it is their 
23 obligation and their burden of proof to prove that that 
24 crack was in that furnace prior to the closing. And 
25 their own inspector said it wasn't. So that, I think, is 
1 indicative of a jury question where the jury could say, 
2 "Look, their own inspector said there was no crack five 
3 days after the closing.'1 But the contract apparently 
4 says the crack was to be in there before the closing. 
5 This family lived in there. They lived in there with a 
6 child. They didn't die of toxic fumes. And, in fact, we 
7 are talking about muddying the water, where is there 
8 written proof, where is there any statement about any 
9 toxic fumes from any expert, or even this Mountain Fuel 
10 guy. The plaintiff says that the Mountain Fuel fellow, 
11 five days later, said that there were toxic fumes. Does 
12 the Court see any proof of that or is that .just the 
13 hearsay statement of a plaintiff that is self-serving? 
14 Now when we talk about — 
15 THE COURT: Well, let's look at that for .just a 
16 moment. There is an affidavit of the plaintiffs. I know 
17 you have objected to certain portions of that. There is 
18 no Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit before the 
19 Court. As I look at the affidavit, though, it appears to 
20 me that they had some basis for some personal knowledge 
21 and can testify as to what they experienced in this case. 
22 I didn't see anything objectionable about the affidavit 
23 that they submitted. 
24 As to that copy of the Mountain Fuel statement, 
25 I think they can testify as to what they received. 
10 
MR. BRUSSOW: Who is "they," Your Honor? 
THE COURT: The plaintiffs. 
MR. BRUSSOW: Thank you. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So I didn't see anything. It seems 
to me that in summary judgment when you are looking at 
affidavits, obviously there has to be compliance with the 
Rules of Evidence. 
MR. BRUSSOW: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Nevertheless, I don't think in 
summary judgment you have to be unduly technical about 
that either and the way I approach that is, see if they 
have a basis for personal knowledge. As I look at all of 
their exhibits, and specifically the affidavit, and even 
that Mountain Fuel notation, I didn't see anything 
technically objectionable about it. 
MR. BRUSSOW: I would like to speak to that 
issue. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have ruled on that issue. 
MR. BRUSSOW: I didn't know the Court had. 
THE COURT: I .just did. I just indicated to 
you that I was aware of your objection and there wasn't a 
Motion to Strike as such. But in light of your 
objection, I considered that. 
MR. BRUSSOW: A Motion to Strike, yes. 
THE COURT: No, not a Motion to Strike. There 
11 
1 I wasn't a Motion to Strike, but you objected to certain 
2 J portions of the affidavit and I looked at their affidavit 
3 in light of the objections you raised. And I've dust 
4 I indicated to you my response to that. 
5 MR. BRUSSOW: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. 
6 Kersey's affidavit does in fact meet that and rebuts that 
7 and save, in fact, on the dfly 9f rtln^ma +f|iffre was no 
8 I split in that furnace. So that is rebutted directly. 
9 There is no proof anywhere in their affidavit that that 
10 crack didn't occur after the closing. The only proof 
11 they have is that five days after the closing, the 
12 Honruds discovered a crack in the furnace. 
13 THE COURT: Are you saying that if someone 
14 doesn't discover a problem, something that has been 
15 expressly warranted on the day of closing, that they are 
16 barred? 
17 MR. BRUSSOW: No. I am saying that they have 
18 to prove it. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 
19 They are not barred. They have to come in and prove the 
20 crack existed before the closing. They can't do that. 
21 They can come in and say, "We found a crack five days 
22 later." 
23 Now if you turn off a furnace on the day of 
24 closing, all right, and it cools down and it cracks three 
25 I days later, what is the difficulty? We are looking at 
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1 the contract. I would like the Court to look at the 
2 I contract too. 
3 THE COURT: I didn't follow your argument with 
4 regard to that. 
5 MR. BRUSSOW: If the furnace was turned off on 
6 the day of the closing and it cooled down, and the crack 
7 in the front of the furnace evidenced itself or occurred, 
8 all right, on the third day after the closing, they have 
9 no right under the contract to contest that because the 
10 contract says it has to be operational and functional on 
11 the day of the closing. And there isn't anv proof in 
12 I this case that it wasn't. And that is a jury question. 
13 Also with regard to this contract, it's their 
14 mutual assent on a warranty here. That is a jury 
15 questioA. Clause 7 right in the very beginning says (E), 
16 all right, "and there are ambiguities in this contract, 
17 then a jury has a right to decide.11 
18 THE COURT: Only if the contract is ambiguous 
19 on its face. 
20 MR. BRUSSOW: I would like to speak to that 
21 issue. Mr. Kersey's contract here says, "Buyer 
22 inspection: buyer has made a visual inspection of the 
23 property and subject to subsection 1-C above and 6 below, 
24 accepts it in its present physical condition, except," 
25 and it says except aqain^. "except as outlined in 
13 
1 . paragraph 7." When, you go to paragraph 7, Mr. Kersey's 
2 contract says, "Special considerations and contingencies: 
• 3 1 
4 conditions and contingencies which must satisfied 
5 prior to * closing." So Mr. Kersey says, "Approval of 
6 the I J * * 
7 electrical heating system, approval by the buyer of the 
M conditior : the swimming pool. Buyer obtained adequate 
y f i t'Mi'iiiii 1 1 - • • '' • 
10 So those contingencies had to be satisfied. 
11 Those are in lieu of any warranty expressly in the 
12 contract and it Is not boiler-plate. It is typed in. 
13 The\ •:• taking it as is except as outlined in 7. And 7 
14 is, the only exception to that, is they have got to 
I a'ppi :: e • the i , e L 
16 heating system. and they rely on that and 
17 there is assent there, there is mutual assent, and they 
IB h In nun I i I'II.K-M I in "The inspector comes in and says that 
19 it is okay. 
20 | III > I hf Kerseys don't want any part of the 
c o n l - i r a i I n I I i I In i M 
22 I satisfied, They make the house available to the 
23 plaintiffs' inspectors. He inspects :* and he said - is 
l!4 okay prior to the closing. 
25 So what we have had to decide here, and what a 
jury has to decide, and that is disputed by the 
affidavits, is when did the crack occur? Now, I don't 
think there is meeting of the minds on l.li>" assent <>n I In1 
warranty here because plainly this contradicts that there 
was an assent are taking the house as 
except what 
to that is v j hx • .; - to get inspection to protect 
yourself. Now they got inspectior protect themselves. 
There was no trickery here r 
inspector said it was okay. 
So what is a jury to decide? Did some time 
after their inspection, <»i i i ir i gtrn , ana Buiiie time i M>e . 
days after the Mountain Fuel, within that period of time 
that furnace had a crack in it. Now ^ think the 
Court c&n say when that crack occurred *s 
certainly can't. They don't have expert that can say 
when that thing cracked, but their expert did say shortly 
before the closing it wasn't cracked.^  
1 "" "*" 
So there is a question, of fact for a jury. Your 
Honor A jury has got to make a decision on this case as 
to when that crack occurred because even if the Court 
believes that there was a mutual assent on the warranty, 
and we are objecting to that- $j\ft +h? tiff i^ a—lti ip^ t^ff 
that, Mr. Kersey"s affidavit says. "I never intended to 
give a warranty." 
15 
And the reason I mention the 30-day wait of 
these plaintiffs is because, you know what, they knew 
t h e r f * NHiiBui I wnr rnn t i » bur.^uBe i t t h e y t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y 
were warranted, they would have called them up and asked 
them to make good on :i t ;. Wli/y would they wait 30 days? 
They called them about the refrigerator. So they wait 30 
days until thgy WAP* *"n flY1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Now : speak tc one other issue and I 
wrote letters, overtures, to try to reasonably resolve 
this matter and he asked them who was the person that 
inspected + 
himself and find out when this furnace cracked 
called the inspector and the inspector said, MHey, I 
hearsay. It is ixot the present sense impression. Nobody 
was there and saw that crack. How can you have a 
b\ a t nil . I n , I lii I i MM I In axguni t f t i t A IbvBt and<: ji n e e w 
something and he says something,, that is a present sense 
impression. But if the accident occurred five days 
b e t i n i i m l I, mi i 11iniin1 iiiull Il I! I I Hi m r i d e n t n e e 
is not a present sense impression Yon didn't see 
accident Nobody saw that furnace crack and that is the 
p r o b 1 ( i n IIM in i Y < " : i l i I I n ' t i i MI i i i\\, k jii i i ill t 
will give you that. When did it happen? There is no 
16 
present sense impression that says somebody says, "Yeah, 
look at that thing crack." 
1 1 II i-;1 1 I"! iii in I, II "111. H e 11 e n i?! i : I II i ** I h < 
volcano erupted, and I say "The volcano erupted/* that is 
not a present sense impression because I didn't see -~ 
happei h. 
So the point is this, there isn't any mutual 
assent on th* warranty and that has been tested here, 
tha b a I n r ",' . < 
(E) on the front page E-l limited that warranty,, He only 
wanted an inspection. How do we know that? You look at 
clause Clause 7 says that is your remedy, inspect 
this thing. So there is an ambiguity because now we have 
got to go a ] 1 the way back to the boiler-plate. I t i*. 
not typted in. ClI . . i in 1 i::i :: I: i j :: • :i t ::  i II gh t it as • 
says now you have got go back to clause 6, which says 
you have got to go to clause (C) I low does a person get 
through a contract like this with a limited intelligence, 
who is not an attorney? 
Now the typed-in portions that I think 
supersede oe Kerseys' 
intent to limit that to an inspection in clause (E) on 
the front and clause 7 where it. is »t«r. typo^ jn, The 
boiler-plate is where the problem happens. 












that provision . «n"t the plaintiffs include that 
provision that they wanted • av-» an inspection? 
MR BRUSSOW: 
THE COURT: I look at the contract. 
MR. BRUSSOW: Yes, it says, "Home to be 
a p p r o v e d I, • ' " * ' ' 'Min t \ n g p i i " i e e I " IIJL« r " m i , ' v e ; l lni 
March 5th " . Kersey is concerned, a 
warranty after the closing is a contingency that should 
have been removed and that is what he said in that sales 
1^  price to be blah-blah-blah, where he dropped the price or 
i.'.ame back with a higher price, but he lowered the price, 
x why? Because he wanted to get out of there clean and he 
1
 wanted them to inspect it and be happy with it, and that 
was the end of it. 
Now, we are Mr. Kersey did 
write to them and when he discovered that the T.R.C. 
17 person said that that furnace was okay, he wrote a letter 
back to counsel and he said, "Hey, I tnllw-'ii in vc i ir 
inspector who said it was okay," and he left it open. 
They ne ei contacted him again. "They went ahead and 
sued. Nobody called him up and said, "What do you want 
to do about it? What do you want to offer?" 
If the Court looks in the file, we offered 
pay the price of repair. refused I'haJ We offered 
to pay half the price of the furnace. They refused that. 
18 
THE COURT: I am not interested in settlement 
discussiong ^ 
BRUSSOW I .deraimid, 
THE COURT: That is not properly before the. 
Court. 
If II Il BRUSSOW But counsel did mention and 
implied that Mr. Kersey wasn't willing to work with them. 
He was, He was. He wrote them the letter about the 
inspeo t :-( i They never got back to him. You won't find 
10 response to his letter in the file. You will find a 
11 lawsuit. So thev went, nh^ ffid •—•t^"+-™d n* •hiiir-Sr^  fr0 fr-*™, 
hired *^ ft*trPrr°y Wfi Y}*™* ™^* v^*^ f^ri*=> — 
13 I THE COURT: But that's all , I hear you. That 
14 really doesn't relate to the i ssue before the Court today 
: a i :i ::! I thi i lk tl: i a t sffor be • t } ::  t:> i mse •] "i b ::  i xegut I K be -
16 resolution to this and, you know, your own efforts in 
17 I respecting the lawsuit, certainly I applaud your efforts 
to try to resolve the matter but I don't think they are 
19 I relevant to summary judgment. 
20 I MR. BRUSSOW: So basically, Your Honor, when I 
< ""HIPi"t I'm in i I hh i i ( p e n i s s u e s 
22 the jury. There is contradictions in this, there's 
23 ambiguity, in this contract whether there was a meeting 
1 i i I I I n 111 II II 11 II Ml I I I I Hi l " l Hi II 11 'i 11 in ! II I 111 1 I I I ' , I I I I . I *i II h i i IIII If-1 
25 proof that the jury can decide that these people, the 
1 9 
1 Honruds didn't believe they had a warranty because they 
2 didn't call Kersey up right away, like they did with the 
3 refrigerator, and say, "Make good or 1 y o\ ir warranty, 
I Kersey They went to an attorney and then 30 days later 
5 there was contact about making good on the furnace. If 
they believed they had a warranty, they would have called 
' i I up like they did on the refrigerator. That is an 
indication, I think, to the .jury that there wasn't a 
i nee t::i i: lg • :: f tl: I s minds oi i a warranty, and the Honruds knew 
10 they didn't have a warranty because of clause 7 and 
11 because of clause (E) the front. 
1 THE COURT "! , there i s no evidence in the 
13 affidavit to substantiate that conclusion. You know, 
14 what yoi i are doing is speculating yourself as to what the 
15 parti es; w"I • plaint: . itended by going to an 
16 attorney, and that you can conclude — you can speculate 
17 lot about why they did that. I mean, there is a b:l g: 
IB difference between a refrigerator not being cool enough 
19 in the beginning and, you know, furnace possibly having 
20 to be replaced. You are maybe talking about a lot of 
21 differences in money, for example. I don't see in your 
22 affidavit and the affidavit by the defendants anything 
23 that would contradict i lh 
24 RUSSOW: Mutual assent? 
25 THE COURT: I Why the plaintiffs decided to 
20 
go to an attorney as to that particular problem. 
MR. BRUSSOW: That correct r. 
THE COUR'i " reeii ,. can say that 
there is some evidence in dispute as to that. What yoi i 
are giving me is argument about, you iF >^i M»*:it »"^ ally 
speculation, as I see 
MR. BRUSSOW: Right ?here is a concrete 
statement in there by Mr. Kersey that he never intended 
to give a warranty. That is directly rebutting their 
affidavit. 
THE COURT 
!IK BRUSSOW: That is a question for the ,iury. 
THE COURT: Well, not necessarily because first 
the analysis has "whether the :: • ::::)ii tr a c: • t I s a mbi g tic: i i s 
because'what he intended, that has got to be parol 
evidence, and that merges into the contract. The written 
contract is eviden ies 
intended, and only if :l t is ambiguous do you say there is 
a ,iury question there. But that is the first analysis. 
And his blank statemep 
only pertinent -here is an ambiguity in 
the contract itself. 
MR. BRUSSOW: And t 
*e feel the ambiguity is, the actual written-in spaces 
that limit their right to have it inspected and in lieu 
21 
1 of the warranty and the clause where we talk about the 
2 counter-offer, where they also limited again, that says, 
3 'The home is to be approved by the buyer and all 
4 contingencies removed." And as far as Mr. Kersey is 
5 concerned, that means, that language has to be 
6 interpreted. That language Mall contingencies'* in his 
7 mind meant no warranties and there is an ambiguity in 
8 this contract, I believe. 
9 And the other issue is basically this: there 
10 is no testimony that that crack was in that furnace prior 
11 to the date of closing. There is evidence apparently 
12 that the crack was there five days later. The Court does 
13 not know — 
14 THE COURT: Let's look at that for just a 
15 moment because as I understood the affidavit, and you can 
16 both speak to this, but their testimony in the affidavit _ 
17 was that when they attempted to first use the furnace it 
18 did not work. 
19 MR. BRUSSOW: That is correct. The reason it 
20 didn't work is because they didn't know how to operate 
21 the digital wall light. 
22 THE COURT: There is no evidence as to that. 
23 MR. BRUSSOW: Right. But see, the Court is 
i 
24 concluding that it didfTt wnrV Vieoanse of the crack in 
25 it, and I don't think the Court can do that because there^ 
22 
is no statement in the affidavit that said the furnace 
wouldn't work because of the crack. 
The Mountain Fuel fellow wouldn't light it 
because of the crack, but that doesn't mean that the 
furnace wouldn't work with that crack in it. 
THE COURT: When the Mountain Fuel man went to 
turn it on for them, he wouldn't do it. So the furnace 
at least as of the date they first attempted to operate 
it, wasn't functioning. 
MR. BRUSSOW: And that date was five days after 
the closing. 
THE COURT: All right. But that is the first 
date they tried to use that furnace because they had to 
have the Mountain Fuel man come and turn it on for them 
because* they had to establish an account with Mountain 
Fuel. 
MR. BRUSSOW: They had to light the furnace. 
The Mountain Fuel man was there to light the furnace; 
that is correct. 
THE COURT: To turn on the gas. 
MR. BRUSSOW: Right. 
THE COURT: In other words, he wasn't there 
just to light the furnace. He was there to turn on the 
gas. 
MR. BRUSSOW: Turn on the gas, right. That is 
23 
correct. 
THE COURT: So they couldn't have tried to use 
the furnace without gas before then. 
MR. BRUSSOW: That is correct. But then the 
question becomes: How did the crack in the furnace take 
place? Did they do it? I don't know that. They said 
they discovered a crack there. Does anyone say how the 
crack got there? when the crack was there? How long it 
was there? How did it take place? Did the thing cool 
off three days after the closing and then it pulled apart 
because one part of the furnace was warm and cold? 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. BRUSSOW: So my issue is this, there has 
got to be some credible proof about when the crack 
occurred* and there is contradictions even in their own 
agent, all right, who says that the furnace was not 
cracked prior to the closing. So obviously it had to 
crack after that date and before the furnace person tried 
to light it, but when was that? And I think that that is 
the burden of proof the plaintiffs have to satisfy rather 
than coming in saying, "Five days later there was a crack 
in there. Our inspector didn't find the crack. When did 
it crack?" And that is a burden of proof. That is a 
question of fact. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
24 
1 MR. BRUSSOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Latulippe. 
3 MS. LATULIPPE: Just very briefly. First of 
4 all, I think the intent is apparent from the four corners 
5 of the contract and we submit it is not ambiguous. 
6 Secondly, we would rely again on Brooks where 
7 there was an inspection prior to the closing. In-between 
8 the time when the initial contract was made and the time 
9 J it closed, and again in that inspection everything was 
10 okay. 
11 J As in our case, the inspection occurred, I 
12 believe, in the middle of March. The house closed a 
13 month later in April. As you stated, as we stated, the 
14 first attempt to turn on the furnace it would not work. 
15 The gas was cut. The plaintiffs could not have used the 
16 furnace. And as to proving that the furnace was in a 
17 condition operable before closing, plaintiffs would not 
18 have possession of the property. They could not have 
19 gone in to verify that fact. 
20 Next, I would just disagree with counsel as to 
21 the contract interpretation again in that approval by the 
22 buyers from the inspection does not negate the express 
23 warranties; and as to time and the 30 days, plaintiffs, 
24 as I said before, they were young buyers. They came to 
25 see me. We got a letter off. We did it as soon as 
25 
1 possible. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. I appreciate 
3 the arguments of both counsel. As I indicated at the 
4 beginning of this hearing, I've read your memoranda and 
5 the attachments to it and I looked specifically at the 
6 affidavits, as well as the contract that is at issue 
7 here, and I am prepared to rule at this time. 
8 Having considered your arguments and also the 
9 cases cited in the memoranda, it appears to me, first of 
10 all, summary judgment as you both know is only 
11 appropriate where there are not genuine issues as to 
12 material fact that are in dispute. And obviously the 
13 burden is on the moving party to prove — to demonstrate 
14 that there are no genuine issues of material facts in 
15 dispute: 
16 Counsel for the defendants has claimed that 
17 there are such that this matter needs to go to the jury 
18 and they look at the two issues that have been focused on 
19 here to resolve this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
20 First of all, I don't see that — although it 
21 wasn't specifically argued by Mr. Brussow in his comments 
22 to the Court, it did appear in the memorandum. I don't 
23 see that that was an adhesion contract standard format 
24 and I don't see anything at all that would indicate that 
25 I it has the indicia of being an adhesion contract. There 
26 
1 is a right to a jury trial only if summary judgment is 
2 not appropriate, of course, and obviously the parties 
3 have their day in court in the context of summary 
4 judgment. If summary judgment is appropriate, that 
5 constitutes the parties' day in court. 
6 I have also indicated my response to the 
7 objection filed to the plaintiffs' affidavit. There were 
8 objections made in the pleadings to the defendants' 
9 affidavit, but I didn't focus on those as such. However, 
10 I did look at those very carefully and was very careful 
11 in reviewing the affidavit of the defendants. Moving 
12 party has to substantiate their claims with affidavits, 
13 appropriate affidavits and exhibits. And then, of 
14 course, defendants cannot stand or the non-moving party 
15 cannot stand on the pleadings but rather must come 
16 forward with evidence that would rebut the affidavits and 
17 I other evidence presented by the moving party. I have 
18 I also indicated the efforts regarding settlement are not 
19 really relevant to this determination. I have not 
20 considered them in coming to the ruling that I have. 
21 It appears to me that the parties did engage or 
22 agreed that an inspection would occur of the various 
23 equipment on the property, including the heating system 
24 and swimming pool, and there were one or two others. 
25 I There is clearly an express warranty in the Earnest Money 
27 
Sales Agreement that warrants the equipment on the 
property and warrants that it is in good working order. 
I frankly do not see anything in this contract 
that in my judgment makes it an ambiguous contract. 
~* Looking at the four corners of the contract, it appears 
to me that there was an express warranty and the fact 
that they agreed to an inspection doesn't diminish the 
warranty, as I see it, but rather it gives some practical 
level of comfort to the new buyers as to the equipment 
that is on the property that they wish to have inspected. 
Nevertheless, I don't think that there is anything in the 
contract that makes it ambiguous as to what the parties 
intended. The defendants' statement he didn't expressly 
warrant that equipment, I think is parol, is not 
permitted under the Parol Evidence Rule and, frankly, 
because agreements of the parties emerged in the 
contract. 
I don't see any facts alleged by the defendant 
set forth a question that would take this out of the 
conclusion that the contract is not ambiguous. Therefore 
as to that issue, I find the contract is clear on its 
face on the four corners. That the defendants warranted 
the use of that furnace to the plaintiffs. 
Now as to Mr. Brussow's issue that there wasn't 
proof as to whether that furnace was broken on the day of 
28 
1 the closing, it seems to me that it was clear the furnace 
2 couldn't have been used by the plaintiffs until they had 
3 their_, natura1 gas hook-up done byMountain Fuel and that 
4 wasn't done until after they got into the property. It 
5 seems to me that the only evidence, the only credible 
6 evidence before the Court is that the furnace was not — 
7 J when the plaintiffs first attempted to use it, was not in 
8 I good working order and could not be used. I don't think 
9 that there is an issue of fact that has been presented to 
10 the Court in the defendant's memorandum that will 
11 overcome the plaintiff's proof before the Court that the 
12 furnace, when it- ™ftp* first attempted to be hooked up, was 
13 not in good working order. I don' think the furnace had 
14 J to have been broken on the day that the contract was 
15 finally signed and the parties obtained possession. 
16 Rather, I think that when they attempted to first use it 
17 and it doesn't work, is a more salient date. 
18 Accordingly, I am going to grant summary judgment in 
19 favor of the plaintiffs for the reasons I have indicated 
20 on the record. 
21 Now the contract, and for the amount pleaded in 
22 the contract, contract does indicate that attorney's fees 
23 and costs may be awarded for attempts to enforce the 
24 contract. All IJiave before me right now as to the 
25 I attorney's fees is the affidavit. There is no 
*v^  -——— 
29 
itemization, and it strikes me as high, a high amount 
given the amount that is in dispute here. So if the 
plaintiffs wish to recover any attorney's fees, I will 
need at least an itemization of your attorney's fees and 
I want it to be reflected as to how much was devoted to 
preparation of the briefs, argument, and, you know, a 
complete breakdown as to how time was spent. When that 
is submitted, the defendants may, if they choose, file an 
objection if there is any objection to that. A 
reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded in this case and 
also costs. But I am not awarding any specific 
attorney's fees until I determine that the fees that are 
submitted are reasonable. 
Ms. Latulippe, I want you to prepare an order 
that comports with my ruling today. 
MR. BRUSSOW: Your Honor, would the Court speak 
to the amount of damages that the Court found with regard 
to the amount of money due for the furnace? 
THE COURT: Well, the amount that was pleaded 
for was $1,100 and that is the only amount before the 
Court. Now, I have actually ruled on the liability issue 
and I just indicated that the amount prayed for was the 
amount of the summary judgment. You know, there is no 
evidence, actually, other than the plaintiffs' affidavit 
as to the amount that they expended for the replacement 
30 
1 I of that furnace. There is also evidence_£h£t they did 
2 I not — that they could not repair that and repair wasn't 
3 appropriate. And based on the information that had been 
4 provided to them, replaced that furnace rather than 
5 repaired it and that is the only evidence before the 
6 Court. It seems to me that summary judgment in that 
7 I amount then is appropriate. 
8 MR. BRUSSOW: Your Honor, the Court is awarding 
9 a brand new furnace in an old house? 
10 THE COURT: That is the only evidence before 
11 the Court at this time, Mr. Brussow. 
12 MR. BRUSSOW: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you, Your 
13 Honor. 
14 THE COURT: The Court is in recess. 
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